Linking Gayatri Colony and Cañada-Sector 6:
The Politics of Urban Citizenship in Informal Settlements of Delhi and Madrid

Daniel Rosenblum

| Erasmus Mundus Master Course in Urban Studies (4Cities) |
| 2016-2018 |
| Supervisor: Assistant Professor Walter Matznetter |
| 1 September 2018 |
Abstract

Urban citizenship research has become a focal point for urban studies, especially concerning informal settlements. In concert with deindustrialization and the neoliberal turn, citizenship has shifted from largely being conceptualized between state and society to one that is constituted in the city, particularly around rights, claims-making, and justice. In this thesis, I follow this thread of urban citizenship to make a transnational generative comparison, using frameworks laid out by Robinson (2006, 2011, 2016), between two urban informal settlements: Gayatri Colony in Delhi and Cañada-Sector 6 in Madrid.

Employing a constructivist methodology, which blends qualitative coding and critical discourse analysis, I argue that urban citizenship is two-fold: concept and tool, which both have become highly fragmented, contested, and remade in distinct urban contexts. By focusing on practices of consensus, resistance, power of the legal system, and how human agency is (de)constructed through humanitarian and activism discourses, I shed light on how urban citizenship is both constituted and transformed by discourse and actions of representative leaders, policy documents, and news. In doing so, I strive to rework dominant developmentalist paradigms between Western theory and the so-called Global South, pointing to the need for more complexity and nuance in urban scholarship.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not be possible without the support of:

Walter Matznetter—for your assistance with the KWA grant and your gentle, trusting guidance along the road to thesis-dom.

My parents—for unconditional support and being there at a moment’s notice.

Leslie—for joining in on the adventure and truly making the most of it all.

4Cities Cohort 9—for my beloved cohort, for being true explorers in and of the city and the wilderness beyond.

This Master’s Thesis is supported by a University of Vienna KWA Grant
Non-English Terminology and Acronyms

*Basti*—informal settlement (Hindi)
*Jhuggi* or *Jhuggi Jhopri*—informal settlement (Hindi)
*Chabola/chabolismo*—informal settlement/informal settling (Spanish)

AAP—Aam Aadmi Party (Common Man’s Party)
BJP—Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party)
CBO—Community Based Organization
CPR—Centre for Policy Research
DDA—Delhi Development Authority
EU—European Union
FSG—Fundación Secretariado Gitano (*Gitano* Secretariat Foundation)
HLRN—Housing and Land Rights Network
HRLN—Human Rights Law Network
JJEM—Jhuggi Jhopri Ekta Manch (United *Jhuggi Jhopri* Forum)
MCD—Municipal Corporation of Delhi
MLA—Member of Legislative Assembly
IGSSS—Indo-Global Social Service Society
INC—Indian National Congress
NGO—Non-Governmental Organization
PIL—Public Interest Litigation
SHO—Station House Officer
TLU—Techno-Legal and Urbanistic

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* Cover photo from *La Gasolinera* mural in Madrid
* I recognize the confusion with the two above acronyms: HLRN and HRLN. It gets me too!
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Chapter 1: Introduction

To me, a 4Cities degree is less a Master of Science and more a crash course in surviving the Pandora’s box of European bureaucracy. As non-EU passport holders, many of us were subjected to the gambit of visa and permit procedures as well as undue stress over whether such and such document would or would not be accepted.

One particular story comes to mind, shedding light on my decision to address themes of urban citizenship in this thesis. Returning to Vienna from Budapest by train, a standard procedure occurred: a border official entered, coming around to check identification. With a flimsy mildewing paper ID, our Italian classmate was quickly given approval. Next, me. With a familiar U.S. passport, I was given a couple seconds of attention, approved, and the guard moved on to other classmates with passports of unfamiliar green and turquoise hues. Disapproval mixed with confusion washed over his face as he failed to grasp what business these non-white foreigners were doing going to Vienna. After my classmates nervously produced residence cards to corroborate their passports, the official’s confusion grew; he was unsure what to make of non-Austrian residence cards. Taking the passports and cards, he retreated to the vestibule to speak with a colleague. After five minutes of scrutiny, the guard returned, handing my classmates their documents with an audible grunt. That was it, right? The guard just needed to confirm a few things from unfamiliar passports—an isolated incident. Unfortunately, this extra glance and further inspection of my non-white classmates was hardly unusual, just one of many stories I was either present for or heard about during our two-year program.

Clearly, our state-inscribed rights as residents were fragmented as they entered the real world, affected by human decision making and institutional bias. Despite more or less the same process of declaring residency for all non-EU students, the right to reside in a particular location, and by extension, citizenship, was always questioned not only by local and state officials, but also by current inhabitants of our new cities. Something as simple as finding an apartment was vulnerable to intense discrimination. As the name of a particular country rolled off one’s tongue, conversation often went cold or a message unanswered for unexplained reasons. Thus, as students, we began to interrogate our own identities, to better understand what it signifies to wider society and what sort of rights we should assume or would need to struggle for.

In the city, where goods, ideas, beliefs, and people come together, what we are and what we are thought to be often become transformed and reconstituted. An identity—as a passport carrying national—is remade and interwoven among new urban lenses, which affect relationships to labor, family, community, and even housing. As we had to renew the search for housing each semester, this was a key site to see how traditional citizenship became perpetually re-inscribed, pushing me further to investigate how citizenship, the city, and housing enmesh themselves in urban livelihoods. But, what about individuals without legally-defined housing rights, who lack land titles or proper documentation? How is their citizenship deconstructed, dissected, and remade in the city? Lastly, how specifically do these urban inhabitants makes claims to the city—for their right to be?

In this thesis, I investigate urban citizenship in the context of the urban informal settlements, otherwise known as a slum, favela, villa miseria, shantytown, basti, jhuggi, bidonville, and chabola. In Chapter 2, I explain why I refer to these urban spaces as urban informal settlements or by their local names due to the stigma associated with slum and the many other terms that emerge from above rather than from

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Belgian, in this case
within settlements. Secondly, I wish to be clear before proceeding, to state that when referring to urban informality, I lean on Roy and AlSayyad’s (2004 in Roy, 2005: 148) notion of “an organizing logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself”. Urban informality is a process—a way of creating and managing the city—often defined by the state, that defies clear dichotomy between a normative formal-informal split. The two categories, in fact, are intertwined, fluid, and constantly remaking themselves.

Initially, my thesis was to be about the politics of precarity. However, my constructivist methodology, which I explain in Chapter 4, allowed my research participants space to discuss issues important to them. Repeatedly, the notion of rights—as urban dwellers and as nationally-defined citizens—appeared in interviews. While precarity was discussed, and is touched on in this thesis, it factored much less than discourse of citizenship, rights, and claims-making. Therefore, I forged ahead with urban citizenship, seeking to understand it in the context of urban informal settlements through the discourse of representative leaders.

1.1: Key Questions

This thesis elucidates on the multilayered-ness of urban citizenship, which scholarship has discussed over the last half decade, by turning towards the margins of the city and those who represent it. In examining cases in Delhi and Madrid, I pose: how is urban citizenship constituted and transformed by discourse of representative leaders in urban informal settlements?

To address this central query and relate it to wider scholarship, I offer three additional questions:

a. How do leaders, both elected and unelected, represent informal settlements in Delhi and Madrid in terms of claims to urban citizenship?

b. How does representative discourse contribute to the trajectories of urban informal settlements?

c. What does this representative discourse tell us about urban citizenship at a global scale?

Today, citizenship matters. By making a transnational comparison, I hope to better understand how citizenship enters the blurred urban spaces of informal settlements. This study will nuance global paradigms of urban citizenship while presenting alternatives of activism, resistance, and claims-making.

Following my review of (urban) informality, (urban) citizenship, and representative leadership, I present two cases—Delhi and Madrid—in more depth and give justification for comparison. Second, I outline methods and methodology of my fieldwork and analysis, describing my constructivist approach, strategies for coding, and discourse analysis. Next, I present findings from each case, offering a glimpse into consensus building practices, resistance, the power of the legal system, and how human agency is remade through humanitarian and activism discourses. In the second stage, I relate these themes to urban citizenship, demonstrating its fragmented and contested nature, as well as offer alternatives of activism, resistance, and claims-making that emerge through comparison. Finally, I conclude by discussing the future of urban citizenship as well as offer lines for future research.
Chapter 2: Terms of the Urban: Literature Review

First, I detail the trajectory of urban informality and how it has transformed since its inception in academia and policy. Next, I synthesize the history of debate on citizenship, specifically urban citizenship, its movement from a state-cried relationship with its people to its renewed role in the city, where residents become agents in their acts of citizenship. Lastly, I explain the role of representative leadership, examining what constitutes a representative leader in this age of urban citizenship.

2.2: Clarifying Terminology: If not a slum, what?

First, a clarification: one might ask why the clunky term—urban informal settlement? Why not use the most common term, slum, to describe these spaces? After all, slum is still widely used in policy and academia. I contend slum acts as a form of stigmatization, popularized not by slum dwellers themselves, but by major institutions and interest groups. I concur with Mayne (2017: 9); the term is often used in development, to “disguise how private capital accumulation benefits a few at the expense of many others, and how the redevelopment of urban ‘badlands’ into desirable real estate can generate still more profits for the few and yet more misery for others”.4 A history of misuse by those in power has turned slums into zones of misery that extend from the landscape onto residents as affixed identities. What the term’s employment seeks to undermine and obscure, whether unwittingly or with intention, are the contributions these neighborhoods make to the city and the resilient livelihood strategies residents employ to sustain themselves in contexts of heightened vulnerability and marginalization (ibid: 10).

When possible in this thesis, I employ local terminology to describe settlements. In Delhi’s case, that would be basti or jhuggi, while in Madrid, chabola is most common. In all other cases, I refer to these spaces as urban informal settlements.

2.3: Urban Informality

Urban informality’s meaning has been pushed and pulled in academic literature over recent decades. Before employing the term, I provide a thorough analysis of past uses and its context for housing.

Informality emerged in a Western economic context, as a binary conceptualization, between formal and informal (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004). Theorists framed the informal sector as primarily ‘trade-service’, meaning visual street labor, while others considered it synonymous with urban poor, squatter settlements, and migrants (ibid). Policy experts caught on with Hart’s study of Accra (1973), in which informal practices were explained as outlets for joblessness and lack of income. Another study built on this, codifying the formal sector as ‘protected’ employment, via unions, governments, or other institutions, but noted these institutions might be less present in the Global South (Mazumdar, 1974: 1).5

Around this same time, the International Labour Organization (ILO) embraced Hart’s ideas, linking informality with instability and illegality as a response to onerous regulations and limited access to credit institutions (International Labour Organization, 1972: 504). The informal-formal duality leapt to

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4 Alan Mayne’s Slums: The History of a Global Injustice (2017)
5 I argue that this protection has eroded in European and North American contexts since 1974, blurring the lines of codification between formal-informal from a bureaucratic standpoint.
South America, splitting theorists between a Marxist conception, which pegged capitalism as responsible for inequality in the labor market, and legalists, who viewed informality as a boon to capitalist competition and entrepreneurialism—all of which could be neatly nested within neoliberal policies (Rakowski, 1994; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Roy and AlSayyad, 2004: 25-26). Today, informality is still being refashioned through context-specific challenges, often leading to renewed global debates on the concept (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004: 28).

Informal Housing

I now turn to the physicality, territoriality, and scale of informal housing. While informal dwellings (whether squat, slum, or informal settlement) are nothing new, their scale is. As of 2005, one-seventh of the globe’s population lived in informal dwellings, a fast-growing number due to economic and technological changes producing massive rural-to-urban migration (UN-HABITAT, 2007: 22; Dovey and King, 2011: 12).

The physical forms of informal housing are very different across regions and classes, meaning rich and poor dwellings might have vastly different characters (Roy, 2005). Scholars have tried to codify their forms, yet there is frequent overlap and exception, meaning typologies should only be seen as heuristics. They can form as coronas on the urban periphery, emerge in agriculture towns with migration, grow around industry, and are even made through state-led resettlement (Roy, 2003; 2005; Aguilar et al., 2003). Dwellings develop in virtually any territory, forming around existing landscapes, whether riverbanks, abandoned buildings, easements, or designated public space (Dovey and King, 2011). Materials vary too, depending on local conditions. Reused plastic, wood, rubber, tarpaulin, brick, and bamboo are all very common (ibid). Binding together this diversity of informal dwellings, Roy argues, is affordability, which “accrues through the absence of formal planning and regulation” (Baross, 1990 and Dowall, 1991 in Roy, 2005).

How has development policy affected informal housing? Alongside continued demolition and eviction, strategies of upgrading, such as in-situ rehabilitation, are now endorsed by major international institutions (Dovey and King, 2011). However, scholars are critical of this approach, which overstates the importance of the physical landscape, or ‘the aesthetic of poverty’, rather than structural issues. A city that “looks regimented and orderly in a geometrical sense” becomes more important than tackling systemic inequalities (Scott, 1998: 150; Roy, 2005).

Informal Housing Histories

In this section, I unpack historical trajectories of informal housing, providing brief histories of Spanish and Indian subcontinental informality. Before focusing on Spain, it is important to give a wider overview of European informal housing. Dovey and King (2011: 12) remind us: “medieval remnants of many European cities are amongst the oldest of informal settlements”. Informal housing has been well-documented outside of the Northern medieval centers which survived because of political exceptions. Due to histories of fractured political regimes, speculative capital, brutal wars, and permeable planning legislation, cities of the Mediterranean, central, east, and southeast of Europe have allowed informal housing to flourish to some extent (Leontidou, 1990 in Leontidou, 1993: 951; Böröcz, 2000; Soós and Ignits, 2003; Kovács and Hegedűs, 2014; Tsenkova, 2009, 2012). Over time, authorities have legalized these constructions retroactively, depending on political will and the socioeconomic status of inhabitants (Leontidou, 1993).
Giving Context to Madrid, Spain

I now illuminate on Spanish informal housing, specifically in Madrid, to contextualize Cañada-Sector 6’s development as part of larger histories of rural-to-urban migration and state intervention.

Franco’s regime concentrated its power and, as consequence, its labor in Madrid. Under the dictatorship, migrants flocked to Madrid, mostly from Extremadura and Andalusia. From 1940-1950, the city absorbed 600 thousand people, ballooning to 1.6 million inhabitants (Nuñez, 2018). A paucity of housing, due to destruction during the Civil War and the high cost of homeownership through the regime’s programs, led many to auto-construct\(^6\) (ibid).\(^7\) As a result, by 1957 there were an estimated 60,000 *chabolas* and other substandard housing in Madrid and its peripheries (ibid; Alonso, 2005: 61).

After Franco’s death, many programs tried to address the scale of informality. Under the 1978-1986 ‘Operation for the Remodeling of Neighborhoods’\(^8\), 1.49 million people were relocated into 38,540 dwellings, affecting roughly 40% of the city’s total population at the time (Ávila, 2014; INE, 2018).\(^9\) Perhaps due to the pace of development, many of the new housing blocks were poorly built, disconnected from the city center, and missing civic infrastructure like parks, schools, and health facilities (Gonick, 2015: 40).

After this program, *chabolas* became synonymous with Romani, or *gitanos*.\(^10\) While only 644 *gitano* families (1.8% of total relocated population) were shifted in the ‘Operation’, the share of *chabolas* occupied exclusively by *gitanos* jumped 40% from 1979 to 1984, meaning 93% of all *chabolas* in the city were entirely populated by this marginalized minority by the mid 1980s (ibid). Consequently, policy turned explicitly to *gitanos* under 1979, 1984, 1986, 1993, and 1994 plans, which offered varying titles using terms like ‘urgent eradication’, ‘eradication’, and ‘excluded’, and were framed as a way to rehouse and socially integrate a highly-stigmatized population (Ávila, 2014). A 1996 plan, entitled the ‘Plan for Relocation’\(^11\), responded to a net growth in *chabolas* despite years of intervention, and as a result, drove *gitano* residents further to Madrid’s periphery (ibid).

The 1990s-2000s saw foreign migrants from Morocco and Latin America coming to Spain for work. Simultaneously, a housing shortage in Madrid contributed to massive speculation and a renewed push for greater homeownership (Gonick, 2015). Most migrants could not afford even cheap mortgages on the periphery nor the few socially-rented units in the city, meaning many opted to auto-construct in Cañada, much like past migrants, as I will show (ibid: 1129). In addition, post-crisis Spain (circa 2008) became more hostile to foreigners, particularly undocumented migrants of color, and many provisions, like access to the public health system, were removed, making it harder for migrants to seek help (Hellgren, 2014; Gonick, 2015).

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\(^6\) To build one’s home, site of work, or other building with little or no professional support

\(^7\) One such development, constructed by the regime, was a neighborhood we visited as a class in Madrid: Poblado Dirigido de Fuencarral, which was finished in 1960.

\(^8\) *La Operación de Remodelación de Barrios* (1978-1984)

\(^9\) This is a shocking statistic; it is hard to imagine a city program doing the same today in only a 10-year span.

\(^10\) This is the preferred term by Spanish language media and many Spanish *gitanos*. I choose to use the word *gitano(s)/t(a)s*, the Spanish word, instead of Gypsy, Romani, Roma, Sinti, or other subgroup names because it is the term *gitano/a* inhabitants use in Cañada and it is not seen as derogatory in the way ‘Gypsy’ is in English-speaking contexts.

\(^11\) *Plan de Realojamientos*
This brief history of informal housing in Madrid elucidates key reasons for how Cañada-Sector 6 came into existence: policy-induced peripheralization of majority Spanish *gitanos*, historical failures of fractured homeownership regimes, and enduring social and racial exclusion. In Chapter 3, I offer more specifics to the history of Cañada-Sector 6, further drawing out these themes.

_A Wider Perspective on Indian Subcontinental Informality_

Like Madrid, Delhi contains a medieval center. Built by Mughal rulers, _Shahjahanabad_ is a packed node of the city, full of industry, consumption, and historical sites, namely Red Fort. Nevertheless, Delhi remained a marginal city until independence and Partition in 1947, which drove thousands of refugees to Indian cities.12 Without housing, these migrants were forced to auto-construct (Banda et al., 2014). Even with the forming of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) under Nehru in 195713, the number of refugees was too great to be addressed by social housing, allowing informal housing to proliferate (ibid). In Mumbai, settlements, like the famous Dharavi, sprung up in the same period to manage the labor force of adjacent industry, namely slaughterhouses, leather, pottery, and textiles (Weinstein, 2014). Buoyed by a policy of ‘supportive neglect’, industry benefited from cheap labor in exchange for ignoring the settlement’s development (ibid: 27).

The early 90s neoliberal turn in India shifted dynamics in informal settlements. Developers and the state aggressively tried to monetize land, leading to mass displacement and eviction in the name of urban beautification (Banda et al., 2014; Bhan, 2014). Leading up to the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi, for example, 40,000 dwellings were demolished in a 3-year period, while Public Interest Litigation (PIL)14, employed by middle and upper classes, contributed to court-legitimated ‘impoverishment of poverty’ (ibid). I shed more detail on this process in Chapter 5.2, but it is important to see how these threats have helped to mobilize political resistance in informal settlements. Localized politics—the interplay of political parties, local leaders, unions, and civil society organizations—came together in fractured forms in moments of prescribed developmentalism15 by the state and private investors, leading to histories of contestation, struggle, and exploitation (Weinstein, 2014; Benjamin, 2008). Often, these politics demonstrated the power of ‘occupancy urbanism’, the notion that informality has the capacity to refashion developmentalist narratives of the city, to resist economic investment from above by politicizing claims to urban land (Benjamin, 2008). The Dharavi Redevelopment Project, for example, is one such case, in which the struggle to monetize central urban land has been prevented through active, intense local politics (Weinstein, 2017). Lastly, it is important to acknowledge that these struggles should not be glorified. Weinstein (2017) proposes a politics of confinement to describe the decades of resistance, which, in her view, fails to lead to social mobility.

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12 Partition split India, Pakistan, and East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh) mostly on religious lines. Stateless refugees flooded both India and Pakistan, contributing to increases in urban populations, all desperately in need of housing.  
13 The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was established to manage the city’s land, today owning about a quarter of Delhi’s territory. The DDA’s existence has been polarizing; while efficient at acquiring and producing middle class housing, it has failed to support low-income residents of Delhi and is also responsible for large scale evictions and demolitions of unplanned settlements, likely destroying more housing than it has ever built in its 60+ year existence (Sheikh and Mandelkern, 2014).  
14 Public Interest Litigation (PIL) allows any party, not necessarily the individual(s) directly affected, to file a case, which is framed as in the interest of the ‘public’ as a ‘public good’. The practice clearly has had unintended or contradictory effects (see Bhan, 2014 for more detail).  
15 Technocratic economic policy put forth to improve conditions in ‘less developed’ countries through an embrace of international capitalism, which supports opening up of internal markets and capital investment.
and improved livelihoods. In Chapter 6.2, I address these claims in the context of urban citizenship and activism strategies.

This section demonstrates the diversity and scale of informality, particularly concerning housing. Informal housing’s ordinariness pushes me to question a particular incongruity: most of the world’s housing has historically been declared informal by a minority of Western scholars and international policymakers. This review serves as a critique to this history and a reminder of the political nature of informality—a site not just for the reproduction of state power, but also its rejection (Roy, 2005: 149).

2.4: To be of and through the City: Examining Urban Citizenship

**Historical Notions of Citizenship**

‘Citizenship’ is attributed to ancient Greece in most cases, part of the *polis*. A citizen, according to Aristotle, both governs and is governed, active in contributing to a life “with a view to virtue” (Cunningham, 2011: 35-36). In contrast to ancient Rome, in which a ‘citizen’ was “articulated through the city”, yet rescaled to the whole of the Empire, ancient Greece was territorially defined by Athens (Isin, 2009: 373). Nevertheless, in both cases, citizenship was limited to a narrow group of men. Slaves, non-residents, women, non-warriors (in the case of Rome), and the property-less were all excluded (Cunningham, 2011: 35; Isin, 2009: 374).

The French Revolution served as a turning point for citizenship. The city rescaled to the state (the ‘republic’ or ‘body-politic’), according to Rousseau’s social contract, refashioning citizenship as a compact between individual and sovereign, transferring certain duties to the state in exchange for care and protection of rights of the citizen (Rousseau, 1762: 7; Miraftab, 2012: 3). Citizenship became tied to the state rather than the city, remaining as such into the 20th century.

Citizenship as state-delimited remained until neoliberal shifts in economic and social policy, beginning in the 1970s. Marshall, in the context of post-War II, reaffirmed citizenship as constituting the fabric of the nation, declaring, “All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Bloklnd et al., 2015: 659; Marshall, 1950: 28-29). Citizenship was packaged between civil, political, and social rights, and in each century, these rights had been bestowed on people by the state. For Marshall, rights were progressively accumulated in a linear fashion, equality unfurling naturally, particularly for western liberal-democratic societies (Miraftab, 2012: 2-3). I question this notion in my cases, as many others have.

Lister (1997), for example, described the ‘differentiated universalism’ of citizenship by way of a feminist lens, finding that citizenship often has exclusionary tendencies not just towards women within the citizen-state ‘social contract’, but also from the outside looking in, such as for migrants and asylum seekers. Yuval-Davis (1997: 22) built on this critique, calling for a refashioned conception of citizenship that is “non-sexist, non-racist and non-Westocentric”, while detached from an exclusive relationship between the state and its people. Rejection of oppression, exploitation, and struggle in the name of culture and tradition, particularly towards women, must be part of a new, social-justice oriented citizenship (ibid).

Further, Chatterjee (2004: 36) added another layer of critique to Marshall’s position, contending that a progression of rights is unrecognizable to Asian and African countries. Instead, he argued that Asian and African developmental states were split, between civil society— “founded on popular sovereignty
and granting equal rights to citizens”—and political society—a form of patronage between state institutions and most of the population—which addressed inequalities through welfare and security (ibid: 37). I nuance these points in Chapter 6, but this review sets the context for urban citizenship in the neoliberal age.

**Shifting Global Order: Turn Towards Urban Citizenship**

Beginning in the 1970s, deindustrialization put tremendous pressure on existing Keynesian welfare and redistribution systems, particularly in Western Europe and North America, leading to a withdrawal of the state and rescaling of power to international and local domains (Brenner, 2004). ‘Glocalization’ processes, as Swyngedouw (2000) describes, gave more power not just to the IMF, World Bank, and European Union, for example, but to local governments, coalitions, and public-private partnerships, pursuing strategies of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989). Subsequently, cities became major sites of reinvestment, as a way to cope with the “shock treatment of deregulation, privatization, liberalization, and enhanced fiscal austerity” that categorized neoliberalization (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 368).

In this context, urban citizenship emerged. As the state’s role shifted, urban communities tapped “movements that defined themselves as citizen” as a way towards justice-based social change (Castells, 1983: 291). New movements linked claims-making with residency, refashioning the urban resident as an agent—or actor—capable of fighting for their own rights. Citizenship became bifurcated, differentiated between formal and substantive citizenship, argues Isin and Nielsen (2008). Formal citizenship was seen as an unrealized ideal, while substantive citizenship is what brings us closer to that ideal, through ‘acts of citizenship’ that “produce citizens and their others” (ibid: 379). In this framework, I contend that ongoing struggle, “transgressions of social realities”, and contested claims-making contradict Marshall’s theory of progressive accumulation of rights, instead pointing to the value of “rupture rather than order” in widening the meaning towards an unstable and fluid conception of citizenship (Janoschka, 2015: 104; Isin, 2009: 379). Daily practices and extra-legal actions from below, then, can reconstitute citizenship as more inclusive, through ‘substantive justice’, which recognizes histories of systemic oppression and the need for self-determination (Miraftab, 2012: 8-9).

Employing Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’16, Purcell (2003) argues urban citizenship must become synonymous with inhabitance, of simply living within the city. In order to destabilize dominant modes of capitalism, urbanites must take back decisions that “produce urban space” in order to conceive of more equitable urban futures (ibid: 577). To Purcell (2014: 151-152), Lefebvre’s ideas should be seen as an ‘urgent utopia’, which enmesh an idealized future in existing, surmountable structures, as a way to move closer towards ‘autogestion’, the self-management of the city by its inhabitants.

But, how can autogestion relate to housing? Holston’s concept of ‘insurgent citizenship’ (2009) takes us to Sao Paulo’s outskirts, to the long history of claims-making by the urban poor through auto-construction of their homes. Excluded from the city center, these residents built their own homes and over time forced the law to re-inscribe itself to codify these illegalities (ibid: 166). As the periphery of Sao Paulo extended and older generations moved closer—spatially and socially—to the city center, land law was reconstituted as “an instrument of calculated disorder by means of which illegal practices produce law and extralegal solutions are smuggled into the judicial process” (ibid: 203). The urban poor forced exceptions in the legal system by their initial illegality, manipulating the law via their land claims

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16 Le droit à la ville (1968) by Henri Lefebvre
in the very same “legal arenas from which they have been [historically] excluded” (ibid: 204). By appropriating the judicial system, the urban poor found space to deepen their rights, thereby participating in the production of the city and remaking citizenship as a claims-making tool.

I come back to the judiciary in Chapter 5’s discussion of Delhi, however, we must be wary to not romanticize auto-construction and ‘acts of citizenship’. Yifatchel (2015: 731) introduces ‘gray spaces’, which are defined as “the dynamic assemblages of bodies, groups, developments and transactions that are neither formally included in the urban society and space, nor evicted or destroyed”. Between the fuzzy cracks of urban society, both marginalized and powerful groups manipulate the law to their benefit, fragmenting inclusive and equitable urban futures into splintered, uneven movements and uncertain trajectories (ibid; Blokland et al., 2015). Holston (2009: 311) underscores this point as it relates to citizenship:

the processes and practices that define citizenship are inherently disjunctive-not cumulative, linear, or evenly distributed among citizens but always a mix of progressive and regressive elements, unbalanced, heterogeneous, and corrosive.

The path to a more just city is unclear and contested. Nevertheless, this evaluation of urban citizenship gives significance to the cases in Delhi and Madrid, pointing to the importance of occupation and appropriation of urban land as a way to practice city-making. Going forward, I investigate this conflictual process, highlighting the ruptures, contestations, and remade conceptions of citizenship.

2.5: Representative Leadership: Who is Who and Why?

What is representative leadership and who holds this power? In reply, I offer a simple definition: representative leadership is a relationship of power between the representative and the people or groups this person purports to represent. This section explains how I chose selected representative leaders in Delhi and Madrid.

Pitkin’s ‘standard account’ (1967) provides the initial framework for political representation (Rehfeld, 2006). Her typologies, while embraced by political science, tend to focus on formalistic representation at the neglect of other forms (Dovi, 2017).17 Empirical contradictions poke holes in Pitkin’s focus on authorization and accountability as begetting illegitimacy, while many scholars have pointed out legacies of oppression in representation and the need for differentiated citizenship, greater inclusion, and a concerted ‘politics of presence’ to address representation inequalities (Rehfeld, 2006; Young, 1990: 158; Phillips, 1995).

Therefore, I embrace an inclusive definition of representative leadership, where “Representation really does happen whenever a particular audience recognizes a case that conforms to whatever rules of recognition it uses, regardless of whether these rules are just or unjust, fair or unfair, legitimate or illegitimate” (Rehfeld, 2006: 4). Representation is not, in nature, democratic, being open to multi-scalar non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example, focused on gender rights or water access, and even despots (ibid). As long as a group or groups accept a representative, then that is their representative even if the representative is leading illegitimately or on false pretenses (ibid: 11).

17 Pitkin (1967) offers four typologies, the most important for political science being 1) formalistic representation, which is defined as institutional frameworks which allow representation through recognized institutions. Other forms are: 2) symbolic: what a representative stands for, 3) descriptive: how a representative resembled the represented, and 4) substantive: the actions of the representative (Dovi, 2017).
Both the representative claim and constituency form important pieces of representative leadership. A claim is the assertion itself by a representative (“No more damming rivers of our community”), while the constituency is defined by “terms of authorization and thus the nature of inclusion in representative relationship” (Saward, 2010: 38; Urbinati and Warren, 2008: 396). A constituency is first expressed territorially; however, it intersects with many non-geographical factors—race, religion, environment, and class—thus giving deeper insight into how issues of justice are addressed and urban citizenship expressed (Urbinati and Warren, 2008: 397). River damming, for example, is not just about where the dam lies spatially, but what cultural groups live nearby, what their socioeconomic status is, how vulnerable the land is, and what wider discrimination exists. These factors amalgamate, forming solidarity and justice amongst a constituency and their representative leader. I consider these nuances when I discuss the leaders in Delhi and Madrid’s informal settlements.

Chapter 3: Bringing in the Cases—From Delhi to Madrid

The sheer growth of urban informal housing is incredible. While there are many options to choose from in comparing notions of urban citizenship, Delhi and Madrid both have very well-documented histories of urban informality, stretching back decades and interweaving with policy interventions, institutional failures, and actions of NGOs and associations. As I will explain, by implementing Robinson’s concept of ‘thinking through elsewhere’ (2016) to make a transnational comparison, I am able to trace singularities—the outcomes of urban informal housing—and examine how discourse of representative leaders has led to multidimensional and often contradictory notions of urban citizenship. In addition, by comparing a case from Madrid with Delhi, I am able to ‘de-center’ urban theory from embedded European and North American hierarchies of power and deconstruct notions of developmentalism that have been the dominate mode to study urban life in the so-called Global South. In this way, we can stretch, contest, and reconstitute theory to better fit global contexts.

In a simple mode of comparison, we find that Delhi and Madrid are the national capitals of their respective countries. As such, they both centralize and control political and economic power within their boundaries and have profound influence on the rest of their nations. Population-wise, Delhi is much larger, more than tripling Madrid’s entire regional population. Its growth took off post-Partition and has continued climbing the last 30 years, while Madrid’s major growth occurred post-World War II through the 1970s, declining after that point (Dupont, 2000: 2018; INE, 2018). I now speak more about each case: Gayatri Colony in Delhi and Cañada-Sector 6 in Madrid, describing their histories, current state, and where my research focus stems from.

3.1: Jungle to Jhuggi: Gayatri Colony, Delhi

Delhi is very flat. When you get a view of the city from above, it does not reveal much. The concrete and brick buildings fan out in all directions, fading into a hazy reddish skyline. On top of Gayatri Colony, located in the northwest of Delhi and only 10 kilometers from India Gate, you have one of the best views of the city that is not from a building or monument. A rocky outcropping, Gayatri Colony was built out of a jungle, as long-time residents describe. Over time, the mound was dynamited away, its rocks used to construct surrounding roadways. The area was also known for needle working and discarded clothing at this time and thus took the name Siwala Pahar as a derivative of the Hindi word sinaa meaning to sew or stitch (P Dayal 2014, personal communication, 14 November).
Figure 1: Map of Central Delhi with key sights and fieldwork site—Gayatri Colony—labeled in northwest (map adapted from Google Maps by author)

Over time, the area was settled by migrants looking to own a plot of land and auto-construct their homes rather than rent (Banda et al., 2014). Many residents we spoke with recounted how they first rented in an adjacent colony (as neighborhoods are called in Delhi), later moving to Gayatri Colony when they heard about a free plot. While the land was owned by the central government’s main landholding agency, the DDA, it was settled on without any intervention by the government, absent from official records until the 90s despite existing for nearly 20 years at that point. Ironically, residents, officials, and activists often point to the historical influence of the DDA and the city’s police in facilitating the settling of land by protecting the construction of homes with the promise of financial kickbacks (ibid; S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June). This is a story that has been corroborated countless times over the years and is more or less an open secret; officials have strategically collected bribes in exchange for the promise of secure construction.

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19 All names have been replaced with pseudonyms to protect identities unless the participant is a highly public official or specifically requested their name to appear, which will be included as a footnote.
The *basti* rose to prominence in Delhi’s vast sea of informal settlements due to a major demolition in March 2011. In two days, an estimated 1000 of 4000 total dwellings were demolished, affecting over 4,000 residents, despite the DDA lacking a proper court order to demolish the settlement (Fergulio and Chaudhry, 2011). This was not the first demolition for Gayatri Colony; another two occurred in 2001 in quick succession (Banda et al., 2014). Nevertheless, in 2011, Delhi activists quickly assembled at the site and then went to the courts seeking an immediate stay order on the grounds of “unlawful demolition and resulting human rights violations” (Fergulio and Chaudhry, 2011: xi). The next day, the stay order was granted, stopping all future demolitions. In the Delhi High Court case, the judgement reads, “according to the Petitioners the residents of the jhuggies in the Punjabi Basti, of which the Gayatri Colony forms part, have been living there for more than 2 decades” (HAQ versus Government of NCT, 2011: 121). Further, the order questions whether a proper survey of the area was ever taken, as the DDA claimed, and also notes that more than 1000 people became homeless without shelter, drinking water, sanitation or health facilities overnight (ibid).

In this context, I visited a Gayatri Colony ‘in transition’ during my 2014-2015 Fulbright-Nehru scholarship. Protected by the order, which had still not been superseded by any proper survey or plans for rehabilitation per the stay order’s guidelines, residents rebuilt their homes, utilizing the stay order to protect future development. Residents began to build bigger, moving from *kuccha* to *pucca*, signifying the turn to solid materials, like brick and concrete from more fragile bamboo and tarpaulin (Bhan, 2012: 136). At the end of my stay, the most visible areas of the *basti* began building two and three story flats, going higher to support ground floor business and growing families.

At this same time, politics in Delhi were undergoing a transformation; the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) came to power on a wave of anti-corruption promises, beating out traditional political parties, Indian National Congress (INC) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to take control of the state government and subsequently Gayatri Colony’s Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA). However, the municipal government (MCD) and central government were still controlled by the BJP, placing an opposition

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20 Literally means from ‘raw’ or ‘unmade’ to ‘being built of permanent materials’ (Bhan, 2012: 136)
party right in between. This political makeup still exists today and is part of the ongoing struggle in Gayatri Colony.

The reason for the building boom, which has continued through my 2018 fieldwork, is not uniformly accepted among residents; some attribute growth to rising property values, others to a reduction in rent-seeking practices and bribery, either due to political changes or the increased fear of the area by police (P Dayal 2018, personal communication, 30 May; Abhilasha 2018, personal communication, 4 June). Lastly, some even feel that the stay order has given residents more stability and protection to build and invest more into their homes (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June). It is likely that an amalgamation of these factors has led to the neighborhood’s recent and continued physical growth.

Lastly, in the context of increased development and changing needs, NGOs and civil society organizations have waxed and waned in support. After the 2011 demolitions, many NGOs stepped in, providing material assistance and legal representation, as Fergulio and Chaudhry (2011) report. Since the threat of demolition has receded, activists and organizations have taken a step back. Yet, as I show, some still retain a presence in the area, providing education and training for residents. As a result, many residents are very involved in the work of these organizations. Alongside this NGO support, the colony has very active elected representatives in the MLA from AAP and the BJP MCD councilor. In my

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21 P. Dayal—Prabhu Dayal—is a pradhan, or unelected community leader, of Gayatri Colony, who I have known since 2014. He specifically requested I use his name in this thesis.

22 Unfortunately, I cannot provide basic demographic information like I will in the following section for Cañada-Sector 6 due to the fact that it does not exist. Only estimates of the current population exist, which vary depending on the source. A Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) survey from 2013, which is widely disputed by residents and activists due to its incompleteness, claims there are only 570 dwellings, roughly 2500 people (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June; Manoj 2018, personal communication, 7 June; DUSIB, 2014). Other estimates put the population much higher, between 8-10 thousand and others suggest even higher (M Singh 2018, personal communication, 22 June; P Dayal 2018, personal communication, 30 May). In addition, according to reports and through conversations, most residents are day laborers: street vendors, cycle and electric rickshaw drivers, security guards, and construction workers (Banda et al., 2014).
analysis, I take a deeper look at many of these representative leaders, elected and unelected, and shed light on the role of urban citizenship in Gayatri Colony.

3.2: The 15 kilometer chabola. Or is it?: Cañada Real Galiana-Sector 6

In contrast to Gayatri Colony, historical accounting comes much more from institutional and academic sources in the case of Madrid’s Cañada Real Galiana-Sector 6, which I call Sector 6. First, it is important to distinguish where I am referring to when I say Sector 6. Cañada Real Galiana, as a whole, is a 15 kilometer long track, comprised of 6 sectors with Sector 6 being by far the largest, at 6.6 kilometers, and most populous, with an official estimate, stemming from the 2011 census, of 2953 people and 1027 buildings (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017). In total, the six sectors consist of roughly 7500 people and 2537 buildings (ibid). The entire linear settlement is located on Madrid’s southeastern edge, cutting back and forth over the M-50 highway until reaching the border with the city of Getafe. The 15 kilometer stretch spans three municipalities: Coslada, Madrid (within Vicálvaro and Villa de Vallecas districts), and Rivas-Vaciamadrid. Moreover, Sector 6 is all within Madrid’s Villa de Vallecas district.

Figure 4: Topographical map of Madrid, Cañada, and its sectors as designated by 2017 Regional Pact (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017: 4; adapted by author).

Sector 6 is the most spatially isolated of all sectors, the farthest away from public transit, and to this day, parts of its main road remain unpaved. Beyond homes, Sector 6 also contains heavy industry, metal scrapyards, and an adjacent landfill, Valdemingómez. It is important to delineate which sector I am referring to, as often, as you will see from interviews, participants reference Sector 6 by naming the whole zone—Cañada. In addition, in media, a roughly 1 kilometer section, made infamous by drug trading, has become a synecdoche for the whole 15 kilometer stretch.
Cañada dates to the 1960s, when the historic sheep herding track was settled on by a rush of rural migrants arriving from Spanish provinces of Extremadura and Andalusia (Requena, 2014: 46; Núñez, 2018). Through the 70s-80s, more land along this trail was settled, as inhabitants moved away from the city to build bigger homes or to build second residences, sometimes with a garden and swimming pool (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017). The settling of Sectors 5 and 6 in the late 80s and early 90s signaled a shift of inhabitants, from rural Spanish migrants to Spanish gitanos and then later Romanian gitanos and Moroccans, mostly from the Rif region (Requena, 2014: 46; B Martinez 2018, personal communication, 21 Mar). The settling of gitanos and Moroccans was due, in part, to the growing housing shortage in Madrid, forcing many migrants to auto-construct on the city’s periphery in order to survive (Gonick, 2015: 1126). In addition, during this period, other chabolas in Madrid were demolished, such as San Blas, Las Barranquillas, and El Salobral, and as a result, many of the inhabitants, lacking options, moved to Sectors 5 and 6 in Cañada (Requena, 2014: 46). In the 2000s, the population began to diversify even more and, as a whole, Cañada received immigrants from Latin American and gitanos from other European countries, predominately the Balkans (ibid: 47).

Like Gayatri Colony, Cañada had a pivotal period of demolitions, which brought the entire ciudad lineal (lineal city) to the public eye. With policies in place, systematic demolitions began in 2007 to prevent greater ‘occupation’ of the former herding route (Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2013). According to city records, close to 200 demolitions were carried out from 2007-2012 as part of maintaining ‘urban discipline’ (Agüí, 2017: 220; Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2013). One particular demolition got the attention of international media and courts. In October 2007, a notice was served to more than 100 residents that their homes were to be demolished in compliance with a judicial order (Borasteros et al., 2007). Residents resisted the order, leading to 27 injuries—23 police and 4 civilian—and the whole clash played out publically, the media capturing the throwing of bricks, tiles, and bottles at the police (ibid). With a huge outcry of residents, NGOs, and the public, this demolition, represented by the example of one Moroccan man and his family’s home, eventually reached trial in the European High Court of Human Rights in 2013 (Gonick, 2015: 1238). In the end, the demolition was declared unjust; prior to demolition, an alternative for housing should have been provided to the family (Agüí, 2017: 220). A day before the court’s ruling, the Spanish government, clearly knowing the verdict, ceased further demolitions without proper alternatives for housing. This policy remained in place until the Regional Pact’s signing in March 2017, which signaled the end of Sector 6 (ibid)

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23 El Pacto Regional Por La Cañada Real Galiana
Due to the exceptional circumstances of the absence of minimum conditions of habitability, the commitment to begin the dismantling of Sector 6 is adopted, by means of an agreement approved by the Regional Government of Madrid and the Municipal Government of Madrid regulating the same conditions.  

The Pact, promising the relocation of residents registered in the zone during the 2011 census, followed up on a 2011 law, ‘Law 2/2011, of the 15th of March, of the Cañada Real Galiana’, which acknowledged the territorial bounds of Cañada between the three municipalities as a neighborhood, thus replacing its previous status as a historic herding route, like the other cañadas in the country. The law set a 2-year limit on making an agreement to rework the classification of land to comply with urbanistic regulations or the land would become under the purview of the Regional Government to complete whatever legal business it needed to (BOE, 2011). However, an agreement (el Acuerdo Marco Social) was not signed for another three years, and even then, the Rivas-Vaciamadrid municipality did not sign it (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017: 55). In 2016, the groundwork was set to come up with a plan through the establishment of a regional commission specific to Cañada, and in March 2017, all municipalities and political parties agreed to sign the Regional Pact, which is the driving policy today and is reflected in my research (ibid: 9).

Figure 6: image of home demolition in Cañada, from well-known, 2011 article posted in the Independent, a UK newspaper (Fotheringham, 2011).

On top of the legacy of demolition and policy intervention, there existed a concerted effort by media and public administration to stigmatize the area, which continues to this day, contributing to the ‘breaking of relations of solidarity and empathy between inhabitants of Cañada and a larger part of Madrid’s population’ (Requena, 2014: 63). In the last decade and a half, the whole of Cañada—by way of an intense and vindictive focus by media and public administration on Sector 6—has become

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24 “Debido a las circunstancias excepcionales de ausencia de las mínimas condiciones de habitabilidad, se adquiere el compromiso de iniciar el desmantelamiento del Sector 6, mediante un convenio que apruebe la Comunidad de Madrid y el Ayuntamiento de Madrid regulando las condiciones del mismo”

25 The law is called ley 2/2011, de 15 de marzo, de la Cañada Real Galiana

26 “romper las relaciones de solidaridad y la empatía entre los habitantes de La Cañada y gran parte de la población madrileña”
synonymous with illegality, misuse of resources, unsustainable practices, poor quality housing, overcrowding, drug use, and violence, among other problems, as Requena (2014) traces from 1994 to 2005. Additionally, in the last 10 years, within a rising anti-Muslim climate across Europe, media has latched on, linking the religion of Moroccan residents of Cañada with delinquency, the drug trade, and insalubrity (Gonick, 2015). Residents of Cañada have been dehumanized over this period, effectively stripped of a strong voice due to hyper-stigmatization by media and public administration. This was a key theme in my research as again and again participants brought up the morbid fascination (morbo) the media has with Cañada, especially Sector 6. My analysis describes some of the recent coverage, in light of the Pact’s plan for demolition and relocation of Sector 6, and makes a case for the inextricability of media influence, policy initiatives, and the current sense of political will.

3.3: Transnational Comparisons and Tracing Complexity

Aside from fulfilling a 4Cities requisite, why compare these cases? On the surface, they have nothing to do with each other, yet, digging deeper, this transnational comparison opens up new lines of investigation for understanding fragmented theories, flows of policy and practice, as well as morphological and political outcomes. My hope is to unpack the politics and utility of urban citizenship by extracting it from Western theory and elucidating its global reformatons.

I make this comparison consciously, to answer Robinson’s call for ‘ordinary cities’ and ‘thinking through elsewhere’ as methodology (Robinson, 2006, 2016). That is to say, I wish to reject the hierarchical ordering of cities, between under-developed and supposedly world-class cities, which has been led by the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) model (Robinson, 2006; Taylor, 2004). Simultaneously, I hope to deconstruct often racist and ethnocentric developmentalist narratives, which frame certain cities at ‘imitators’ (Delhi), always needing to play catch-up to world-cities, such as New York, London, Tokyo, or Madrid (Robinson, 2006: 96, 66). I argue for more complexity when making sense of global circuits of knowledge, capital, and innovation, and a “stronger focus on the politics of urban development initiatives” which can reveal power structures (ibid: 113).

Operationally, this means finding new ways to compare—to test ostensible global theories—and remake assumptions of existing realities and processes. Rejecting constraints of standard comparison, Robinson (2011: 13) proposes a focus on “assemblage, multiplicity, and connectivity” to see the unintended flows and interactions that have produced new outcomes in urban informal settlements. In practice, as I demonstrate, we can examine outcomes as singularities—rejecting aspects of Marxist urban theory—to trace particular outcomes in informal settlements, as a way to better understand how urban citizenship has been constituted and transformed (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994; Robinson, 2016).

As a result, I can evaluate constitutive discourse and local histories that not just stretch the notion of

27 Other terms include third-world, developing, less-developed, and Global South in place of under-developed
28 Assemblages, or polyphonic assemblage, as Tsing (2015) describes, is most useful as a basis for understanding this method of comparison. It is the paying attention to the “multiple temporal rhythms”, whether in farming, music, factory labor, or informal housing, in my case (Tsing, 2015: 24). One should recognize the complexity and unintended intertwinements which cause certain ideas, practices, or beliefs to grow or be suppressed.
29 Robinson, in her post-structuralist framing, asks us to break free from the ‘concrete totality’ proposed by Marxist urban theory (Robinson, 2016).
urban citizenship, but indicate where the nexus of power lies across scales. In the following analysis chapters, I keep Robinson’s framework of comparison in mind.

Chapter 4: Constructivist Approach to Research: Methods & Methodology

It is also critical to present my approach to doing research. Following Creswell’s (2014: 61) constructivist approach, my study is qualitative, although supported by quantitative data concerning my cases. I am concerned with establishing the “meaning of a phenomenon from the views of participants”, rather than posit meaning and have my participants react.

This dovetails with Creswell’s (ibid: 295) notion of ‘emergent design’, in which research design cannot be tightly restricted and is at the whim of what the researcher finds in the field. As such, the research is reflexive, adapting to newfound topics and issues that participants themselves bring to light, while also posing questions to oneself as a researcher in the field. I came to urban citizenship this way, finding it every step of the way, in discourse of participants and hovering around larger discussions. This design pushed me to investigate folds of urban citizenship at work in Delhi and Madrid, to sample case studies in order to better understand a current phenomenon (Creswell, 2001: 203 in Islar and Irgil, 2018).

4.1: Methods of Field Research

My qualitative methods were simple: observation, informal dialogue, and semi-structured interviews. Typically, I would arrange to meet with a participant of interest, who I identified within my representative leadership criteria. Unless it was impossible to meet again, such as with elected or appointed officials, I first had an informal conversation or dialogue with participants and others in proximity, and then went on to ask for a more specific time to have a longer, often recorded conversation, which relied on an adaptable script.

4.2: Experience in Madrid

My research data for Madrid comes from January 2018-May 2018. During this time, I interviewed three government officials from the Regional Government of Madrid and Municipality of Madrid, the Priest of the local Parish, two individuals working in the NGO sector, and the head of Sector 6’s neighborhood association. The majority of interviews were completed in person and in Spanish, recorded, and transcribed. In a few cases, email was required for follow up. In addition to interviews, I attended a number of assemblies and conferences, at which I recorded statements from other important leaders within local police, local and regional government, and policymaking. Lastly, I visited Sector 6 a handful of times, accompanying members of a prominent NGO in one instance, and as a result, was able to observe and get a sense of the environment, which was spatially distant from Madrid’s center.

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30 Many studies have successfully deployed Robinson’s framework of generative comparisons. Describing these examples in detail is beyond the scope of this paper, but one can refer to Ren (2017), Ward (2004), and Picker’s (2017) fascinating book—Racial Cities: Governance and the Segregation of Romani People in Urban Europe, for more information.

31 See Chapter 2 for clarification.

32 Comunidad de Madrid and Ayuntamiento de Madrid

33 All Spanish documents—transcripts, articles, speeches, etc.—were translated by the author. Some of the original Spanish is reproduced in footnotes.
To arrive in Sector 6, it took 90 minutes of riding the metro to the end of the line, walking across barren land, over a highway, crossing the main road for garbage trucks into the Valdemingómez landfill, and entering through a small hole busted in the concrete barrier. This was just to reach the settlement, but to visit the rest of Sector 6, one had to walk another 5-6 kilometers. These journeys to Sector 6 made me reflect on how spatially isolated the settlement could feel from the rest of Madrid, especially if one is car-less. However, if viewed from another lens, through a socio-cultural or political imaginary of Madrid, Sector 6 circulates through the entirety of the city and the whole of Spain, by way of its heavy stigmatization and the attention media and politicians give to the former sheep herding route. While spatially isolated, you would be hard pressed to find Madrileños/as (Madrid residents) unaware of Cañada or without an opinion.

Perhaps due to my difficult experience trying to meet bureaucrats in my own country, I found politicians much more accessible for interviews in Madrid, even more than participants in the NGO sector. Often, I just looked up online pages of the Regional Government or Municipality and emailed to schedule a meeting. Incredibly, people responded. In general, though, reaching participants and scheduling interviews proved taxing. Despite numerous emails, phone calls, and WhatsApp messages, I was often ignored or deferred to a later date by NGO officials and occasionally bureaucrats. To counter this, I often tried to extract contact information of key representatives when speaking to other participants, knowing that my study intentions could be corroborated by them, which was important in a stigmatized area like Sector 6, where trust is low.

If anything could exemplify the difficulty of conducting research in Sector 6 as a foreign researcher, it would be my first solo visit to Cañada, in which, upon entering, I was asked if I wanted to buy drugs by a gitana woman. Out of confusion, unsure what to say in my uneasy Spanish, I told her I was lost and looking for the metro, hoping she would point me into the settlement. Instead, she pointed back to where I came from and guided me to the ramp that crossed the A-3/M-50 highway interchange. In this manner, Cañada, as an outsider, without any accompanying organizations, made itself to be impenetrable. There were particular spaces that I was not able to visit due to their activities (drug use or other illicit behaviors) or how I was perceived and I knew this would be a limitation throughout fieldwork. Nonetheless, I made contacts and secured interviews as much as time allowed and found public opportunities to hear representative leaders speak.

4.3: Experience in Delhi

In Delhi, my research comes from a 10-month Fulbright-Nehru scholarship in 2014-2015, although renewed primary fieldwork was conducted from May-June 2018. During this time, I spoke with two elected officials, one set of appointed officials from the DDA, and numerous activists, NGO leaders, and residents who are very politically involved. The majority of interviews were conducted in Hindi, recorded, and transcribed with support from an Indian colleague, Bincy Mary George, a sociology student based in Delhi. A few interviews, however, were done in English.

Despite extreme heat (42°C most days) and roughly a month of fieldwork, I found research in Delhi much easier than Madrid due to a few factors: 1) prior connections, 2) familiarity with the environment and 3) accessibility of the field site, in part due to lessened stigma. Having initial contacts needed to setup the first interviews even before arriving, as well as knowing my participants’ familiarity with the

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34 Bincy was an invaluable asset during fieldwork, interviews, and key lines of questioning. Her knowledge undoubtedly helped to strengthen this thesis.
topic made transitioning to fieldwork faster. Additionally, and I will reflect on this further below, is the ease, as a foreign researcher, I had accessing my field site. The neighborhood of Gayatri Colony in Delhi is relatively central, porous with many people flowing in and out throughout the day, and known to be hospitable to foreign and local researchers. In this way, I never felt intimidated or like I was unwelcome in the field. In comparison to Madrid, I had the freedom to walk around the area as much as I wanted and at all hours of the day.

4.4: Positionality & Limitations

In a discussion with one of my participants, Ekta Sachan, an expert in urban research at the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), she mentioned as a fieldworker in India, whether foreign or Indian, you are often treated as a guest, and, thus within Delhi, potential participants are often approachable, typically inviting you in for tea even before the premise of the meeting is established (E Sachan 2018, personal communication, 15 June). For me, this held true and it was often hard to get out of taking chai with people we spoke to even for 10 minutes. In Madrid, treatment in the field was much different. All of my meetings had to be scheduled beforehand or through invitation from another reputable figure. I could not enter Sector 6 on a whim and begin speaking to people because, in certain zones, at least, I was perceived as someone looking to purchase drugs. This dichotomy of treatment brings up the importance of positionality as a social researcher (Bourke, 2014).

While I was an outsider in both cases, in Madrid my access to the field was limited by my social position, how I could choose to present myself, language capabilities, and my own knowledge of the area. In Delhi, my positionality allowed me certain mobility due to my gender, skin color and language skills, as an English-speaking white male. In many cases, exceptions were made for me, for instance, to speak more quickly with a representative due to my perceived importance. In other words, this research is influenced by my own subjectivities despite the following of a rigorous research process.

To finish, I want to highlight some of the limitations of my research process. First, is time: given more time in both cases, I would have been able to deepen findings by reaching out to more potential participants in the field. This could have improved my fieldwork in Madrid, where comfort and accessibility of my chosen field site were challenges. In addition, my Madrid portion of research was limited by the lack of resident voices. Aside from the head of the neighborhood association, I only spoke to three residents of Sector 6 and thus my knowledge of their challenges, struggles, and perspectives is limited. Lastly, language ability could always be improved. While I am proficient in Spanish and able to conduct interviews, it was a limitation to participating in conferences, for example, or making easy dialogue to secure future contacts while in the field. For Delhi, my Hindi skills are rudimentary, so I was dependent on Bincy, my research assistant, for many interviews and thus unable to provide follow up in as fluid of a manner as I would have liked.

4.5: Methods of Data Analysis

I analyzed my data using a mixture of qualitative coding and critical discourse analysis. Doing so developed my understanding of participant, media, and policy discourse and their deep intertwine ment.

First, I took interview transcripts and evaluated them, using qualitative coding as a heuristic, per Saldaña’s instructions (2009: 8). I categorized and coded text, developing labels from direct speech acts as a way to work towards defined patterns and themes not just for what participants said, but how they
said it. My coding was highly reflexive, unconfined by pre-selected categories, which ultimately altered my initial research questions for the better and provided more robust conclusions.

Media and policy had varying degrees of importance for participants in Delhi and Madrid. To review these texts, I employed critical discourse analysis to better understand unequal power relationships and forms of hegemonic discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). I blended Foucault’s understanding of discourse (1968, 1972) with more practical applications put forth by Fairclough (1992) and Jørgensen and Phillips (2002). While I do put stock in what is capable of being said, and how that speech emerges, particular as part of political practice, I find a practical application of, what Fairclough terms, textually oriented discourse analysis (TODA) useful in reconsidering the ‘social agency of the speaker’—how discourse not only shapes the speaker, but how the speaker reshapes discourse (Foucault, 1968,1972; Fairclough, 1992).

Practically, this calls for examination of discourse at three levels: linguistic features, discursive practice, and circulating social practice (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 68). Using these parameters, I investigate media and policy to understand its individual components, interconnectedness with other texts, its contested or shifting discourse (interdiscursivity and intertextuality), wider social relationships, unequal structures of powers, and ideological effects within said text (Fairclough, 1992: 231-239). Due to the sheer scale of media and policy documents, I have selected two to three key or representative documents per category per case.

Chapter 5: Analysis I—Evaluating Discourse and Trends in Delhi & Madrid

Data was collected concerning many different key themes and each respondent, depending on their perspective, had very different views. In the first stage of analysis, I interweave experiences from both cases as a way to demonstrate the fluid level of comparison as well as move closer to a nuanced understanding of urban citizenship. The first section analyzes discourse concerning consensus-driven politics in Madrid and political resistance in Delhi, while the second section takes a deeper look at legal aspects and policy concerning both cases. The final section evaluates discourse from humanitarian perspectives, pointing to the importance of livelihood and activism in reconstituting realities in urban informal settlements.

35 See Appendix, Section I for snapshot of qualitative coding techniques
36 In order to not clutter my shift towards practical applications of TODA, I provide more theoretical explanation here. Foucault focuses on what is left out, or incapable of being said, and relates this to controls over desire and power, making the speaker’s role very critical (Foucault, 1972: 216). Referencing scientific discourse in medicine, economics, and human sciences, he asserts that “positivity of discourse, their conditions of existence, the systems which regulate their emergence, functioning and transformation - can concern political practice; to show what political practice can make of them” (Foucault, 1968: 69). Basically, the reinforcing nature of particular scientific discourse is a highly political process, producing more dominant claims and forms of knowledge. Fairclough, in Discourse and Social Change (1992: 45), contests Foucault’s position, arguing that Foucault “excludes active social agency in any meaningful sense”. Instead, Fairclough argues for a ‘dialectical’ evaluation of discourse, that sees the speaker as both acted upon and commanding agent.
37 See Appendix, Section I for snapshot of critical discourse analysis techniques. It is out of the scope of this thesis to provide an exhaustive explanation of TODA/critical discourse analysis, but both Fairclough (1992) and Jørgensen and Phillips, (2002) provide highly informative looks into this method. These techniques of discourse analysis will also be reflected in Chapter 5’s evaluation of media and policy in both cases, and explicitly and implicitly.
5.1: Coming Together: Consensus Practices and Political Resistance

*Madrid: Policy and Periodicals*

Key in the discourse of representative leaders of Cañada-Sector 6 was a notion of consensus. The Regional Pact, the guiding policy document for the zone and supposed framework for reaching a positive solution for all parties implicated in Cañada, as well as more recently signed documents like the Relocation Agreement have had significant impact on the ways in which all parties seek solutions and refer to the ongoing situation. In addition, many see these documents as aspirational visions for the future.

Studying the Regional Pact, consensus discourse is embedded throughout. In the Pact’s guiding principles, participation and consensus are expressed explicitly. It states that nothing can be achieved without the participation of all implicated groups, listing them as the Regional Government of Madrid, the municipalities, the parliamentary groups, third sector social entities, and neighborhood associations, and that they all should collaborate if they want success (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017: 14). Right below is an underlined and capitalized point entitled “CONSENSO” meaning consensus. It insists that there must be maximum political consensus, that all works will be developed through joint participation (ibid). The text goes on, underscoring this notion of consensus and full participation, mentioning that the Pact constitutes a stable political agreement for public administration, and will continue until its end, independent of electoral shifts (ibid: 12). This text is bolded in order to indicate added importance and comes right after a section emphasizing how political will must resolve key issues and maintain unanimous consensus of political forces (ibid: 11). Consensus through political will, with all parties supporting the approach, is a lynchpin of the Pact.

In addition, when examining for intertextuality and the orders of discourse, we find the real strength of the text comes from the authoritative voice of political parties and the public administration and less so from social entities and residents. The Pact uses project management language—rigid ordering, step-by-step processing, and active, future oriented verbs—to indicate how residents and entities must do their part to resolve the problem of Cañada. However, in the Pact’s organizational structure, political leaders and public administration are given precedent, as demonstrated by the dearth of representation or voting power for neighborhood leaders or social entities in the Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo) or the Follow Up Commission (Comisión de Seguimiento). Only in rare exceptions are residents able to contribute to the Executive Committee (ibid: 22). On one hand, all entities, public and private, are implicated in the Pact, yet in the bodies of major influence, resident and entity voices are peripheralized.

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38 El Convenio de Realojo; Unfortunately, the text of this document was provided too late to be included in this thesis.
39 “PARTICIPACIÓN: Ninguno de los fines marcados puede alcanzarse sin la participación de todos los agentes implicados. Comunidad de Madrid, Ayuntamientos, Grupos Parlamentarios, Entidades del Tercer Sector y Asociaciones de vecinos, todos debemos colaborar si pretendemos alcanzar los éxitos previstos”
40 “CONSENSO: Para lograr el máximo consenso político, todas las actuaciones se desarrollarán mediante la participación conjunta”
41 “este Pacto constituye un compromiso político firme para las Administraciones Públicas, hasta la consecución de su fin, independientemente de los posibles cambios políticos que se produzcan en las mismas”
42 “Es muy importante avanzar desde la voluntad política de resolver los problemas y manteniendo el consenso unánime inicial de las fuerzas políticas”
43 “En casos excepcionales y justificados podría solicitarse por los miembros del Comité la consulta o presencia de miembros de las Asociaciones de Vecinos en las citadas Comisiones”
Turning to the news, I found important discourse that contributes to a theme of consensus. An *El País* article, ‘The Pact of Cañada plans the knocking down of the most controversial zone’, offers a direct and clear assessment of the Pact, demonstrating the types of authorship public administration has over the text (Sánchez, 2017). It gives voice to government motives, that, through this objective-driven project, led by political will, the problem of Cañada can be (re)solved. It offers a specific section for Sector 6—“40% live in this sector”—in bold—and normalizes the steps taken in the Pact, by describing the previous agreements that were signed as a lead up to the Pact, as well as the bodies of participation put in place that will represent the Regional Government, affected municipalities, social entities, and neighbor associations (ibid). Through these matter-of-fact procedures and their related interdiscursivity, the article gives power to the Pact, conferring it more authority and credibility in the eyes of the public, as a valuable, consensus-based initiative led by politicians.

**Madrid: Consensus Reflections by Participants**

In interviews, my participants expressed varied views of consensus. Beginning with public administration, participants tended to express the importance of working together and to utilize political will to, somewhat counterintuitively, depoliticize the Pact. Páramo, the head of the Regional Government’s Commission for Cañada, expressed to me that consensus was key to depoliticize the process, as well as how the Pact, itself, was strengthened from the input of not just politicians, but also social entities and neighbors (J.A. Páramo 2018, personal communication, 2 Feb). Another official from the Municipality of Madrid’s Commission for Cañada, Martínez, expressed that the structure of the Pact was made for “taking decisions together, it will be dialoguing, sector by sector, what is best” (B Martínez 2018, personal communication, Mar 21). However, representatives from NGOs saw consensus as important, yet problematic. Escobar of Fundación Secretariado Gitano (FSG) found that while everyone is implicated, the administration is not paying enough attention to social entities or uneven neighborhood representation, while a representative of Caritas, Cortes, felt that it is important that the space for residents to participate be amplified and made more effective (A Escobar 2018, personal communication, 18 Feb; N Cortes 2018, personal communication, 25 Apr).

From Agustín Rodríguez Teso, the head of the Parish, we get a more grassroots notion of consensus, yet one that reinforces the position set by the political parties and public administration in the Pact. He believes in the Pact and the value of implicating all parties—that solutions must come from all sides—framing it as “a communitarian process [that is] much slower than a forced transformation. There is more trustworthiness, more consensus, but it takes a lot of time” (A.R. Teso 2018, personal communication, 5 Feb). The process the Pact establishes is key for him, as he bridges both the public administration and the community as a well-respected representative of the Parish.

Lastly, is Abdel, the head of Sector 6’s neighborhood association. He was the only one dismayed by the consensus driven approach of the Pact. Due to the fact that all political parties and entities have already signed off on the dismantling and relocation of Sector 6, there is nobody he feels he can protest to, nobody who is answerable to particular problems that might throw a wrench in the relocation process. His predicament was best expressed here: “the administrations are in agreement, people can protest to nobody. To who are you going to protest? At yourself for yourself? I cannot” (Abdel 2018, personal communication, 17 Apr). He followed this statement with a hearty laugh, but it does reflect his general displeasure with the whole process, with the administrations’ strategic degrading of

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44 “El Pacto por la Cañada prevé tirar la zona más conflictiva”
45 “El 40% vive en un sector”
conditions before the signing of the Pact, and the NGOs, which are dependent on the public administration for guidance and funding, and, thus, less concerned with problems residents have, beyond immediate crises (ibid).

While it is just one voice of a resident represented here, he is a leader in the community, especially for Moroccan residents. This directs us to notions of the post-political, in which political decision-making becomes about breeding consensus rather than true confrontational politics (Swyngedouw, 2011). The process of relocation and fitting Cañada into the existing legal and socio-political framework requires a “managerial approach to government” which strips away a true politics, or a politics of confrontation as Mouffe (2015) describes (Žižek, 2002: 303 in Swyngedouw, 2011: 373). Instead of allowing for this space, the Pact and its supporters insist on consensus and the implication of all parties in bringing a solution to Cañada, one that has already been determined by major political parties and public administration.

_Shifting Winds Within the Vote Bank: Playing Through Political Resistance in Delhi_

Turning to Delhi, I now reflect on the politics of resistance occurring in Gayatri Colony as a way to contrast the experience in Madrid. Two articles from one of India’s leading newspapers, The Hindu, demonstrate the complexity of urban electoral politics in Delhi, and the space it has created for informal resistance.

The first article, from May 2017, entitled “Urban politics in India: blurring the lines on what is local” describes, using technical and academic discourse, the current situation for election-based politics in India, specifically Delhi, remarking on shifts in voting due to the changing relationship between local issues and national narratives. The author argues that between the multi-level local governance, of MLA, MCD councilor, and even the local pradhan⁴⁶, voting can be shifted by local concerns depending on issues like “differentiated access in services”, but it also must consider wider campaign strategies at the party level, for instance (Joshi, 2017). Local agency of residents, depending on wider contexts, can shift trajectories of local politics and reshape what is referred to as ‘vote bank politics’ in India.⁴⁷

The second article, from October 2013, entitled “AAP eating into Congress, BJP vote bank: Survey”, evaluates the changing political landscape in Delhi right before AAP won a resounding victory in the Delhi state elections. It demonstrates the self-awareness of Delhi’s lower class by referencing Junaid, a vegetable vendor, who is contemplating switching from INC to AAP, as a rejection of the vote bank system that has pervaded Delhi’s lower classes, especially those in living in _jhuggies_ (Ali, 2013). Using survey data and commentary from political science scholars, the author demonstrates, in a matter-of-fact manner, that voters know their power and that AAP messaging is effective in “mobilizing people around issues of governance and service delivery” (ibid). This article points to what my interviewees indicated—that residents are learning to manipulate their elected officials, to demand improvements and resist marginalization within the standard vote bank politics of the city.

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⁴⁶ For description of _pradhan_, see footnote 21 on pg. 17

⁴⁷ Vote bank politics are described as strategically shaping very loyal group of voters who consistently vote for a particular candidate or party. The strategy is typically used as a way to divide and maintain voting blocs (see Weinstein, 2014 for further explanation)
Residents and activists in the *basti* Gayatri Colony have become adept at manipulating their politicians. Among activists who are also residents, the focus is on struggling for civic services against locally-elected leaders. Through a Community-Based Organization (CBO), residents Manoj and Abhilasha spar openly with the local MLA and other government departments to improve their services. As such, they are now strategically using the MCD councilor to gain services, such as improved sewage drains, the paving of roads, hired street cleaning services called *asha* workers, and two crèches for the many infants of the neighborhood. One instance is emblematic of this strategy: after the recent election of Adesh Gupta as the MCD councilor, he was invited to the neighborhood for International Women’s Day. When he arrived, Manoj called Gupta to the stage, asking aloud what he plans to do for the area. Manoj did this strategically: “so we caught him right there, and he responded by saying that from today I will adopt this area” (Manoj 2018, personal communication, 7 June). In private, through the CBO, they hammered out specific plans in a small group, and have progressed to improve Gayatri Colony’s services, which has been a long journey beginning well before Gupta’s election, according to Manoj (ibid). Even Abhilasha acknowledges that Gupta is completing work in the neighborhood, listening to their problems unlike past representatives (Abhilasha 2018, personal communication, 4 June).

On the flip side, the CBO has been a thorn in the side of the current MLA, Hazari Lal Chauhan. Over a period of 3 years, Abhilasha and Manoj fought the MLA to get a bore well—a ground water pump—installed near the *basti*. At every stage, the MLA ignored them and made the process more difficult. They went around him, meeting with leaders of the government’s water department, the Jal Board, writing officials, and appealing for the well to be built and the funds to be dispersed from the MLA, as it is his responsibility. This process failed when the Jal Board did not follow through with their work to order the bore well. As a result, the CBO went directly to the Chief Minister of Delhi (CM), the head of the *Aam Aadmi Party* (AAP), Arvind Kejriwal. In an unprecedented move, they went around their local representative and shamed the MLA for not doing the work he promised. Quickly, the paperwork was processed, phone calls were made, and the work began. After 3 years of lobbying, complaints, writing letters, and attending meetings, the funds were allocated and the well was built. In the end, the MLA was annoyed and embarrassed by the CBO’s circumventing of his authority. He demanded Abhilasha apologize for her complaints and going to the CM. Here is her response:

“Why should I go sir? I was told that if I say thank you, my relations with him will be better. I said that I had gone to him ten times, and when he didn’t listen to me, sir, he threw papers on me like this. He scolded me so bad, saying who are you?” (Abhilasha 2018, personal communication, 4 June).
Abhilasha is asked to say thank you, but responds defiantly, aware of her effectiveness with the CBO and working with the MCD councilor. As a result, she can ignore the MLA and afford to publically disrespect him, thus appropriating the vote bank political process for her own community’s benefit. Manoj is aware of Chauhan’s neglect for the area as well, yet openly and symbolically rejects the necessity of their MLA:

“Our CBO went and burned his effigy. He hates us. He is particularly irritated with this area, he says the people here are bad and that we burnt his effigy. He hates me and Abhilasha. When we go to meet him, he doesn’t even show his face” (Manoj 2018, personal communication, 7 June).

The two of them, as citizen-activists, manipulate their representatives, use them strategically, and are able to work effectively to challenge existing paradigms.

For activists from NGOs and civil society organizations, resistance comes more through public protest and the legal system rather than engaging with and challenging elected politicians. For activists of Jhuggi Jhopri Ekta Manch (JJEM), their role is to mobilize visual protests, to block roads or hold a dharna, a form of non-violent, sit-in protest in front of officials’ offices or in public space (A Kumar 2018, personal communication, 8 June). Activists at the Indo-Global Social Service Society (IGSSS) focus on stopping any and all evictions from happening, which means going through the state, typically by means of the court system, but first it might require a moment of crisis, in which a community is under threat, like the 2011 demolitions in Gayatri Colony, in order to mobilize a strong demonstration of protest and solidarity (Aditya 2018, personal communication, 4 June). During the 2011 demolitions, many community members were arrested, spending multiple days in jail because they blocked bulldozers and fought police assaults (P Dayal 2018, personal communication, 30 May). Still, they continued until the stay order was granted a day later. From this threat of eviction arises a stronger sense of community solidarity and resistance against the state, which is eventually played out in court.
5.2: Opening up the Legal System: Perspectives on Existing Policy

In this section, I explore the contours of the legal system for each case, demonstrating the power of the judiciary for residents and activists in Gayatri Colony as well as the techno-legal and urbanistic (TLU) framing and policy implications in Cañada-Sector 6.

Delhi—Managing Stay Orders and Constructing Power Through the Courts

In the last two decades, the courts have become an important battleground for shifting land claims in informal settlements. For Gayatri Colony and adjacent bastis, the judiciary has acted as a safeguard against government-led demolitions and a tool for residents to protect their property.

A 2011 article in Kafila, a popular, online, English-language newspaper geared towards left-leaning activists, scholars, and other researchers, the situation during the demolitions is detailed, as the High Court petition was still processing—the outcome uncertain. Written by Dalit activist Paul Divakar, the article is a call for justice and for scholars and fellow activists to support the ongoing struggle. Using humanitarian discourse laced with notions of state-led oppression and violence, the judiciary approach is framed as “the protection and promotion of human rights and also of inclusion efforts”, a way to ensure the stability of Delhi’s urban poor, especially those living in bastis (Divakar, 2011). The appeal, situated in the judiciary approach situated at the end of the article—as the big move undertaken by activists—demonstrates its importance in securing land claims for basti dwellers.

One can also look to the actual stay order issued a few days later by the Delhi High Court for clues. The order takes a very legalistic framing, couching the decision within existing DDA policy and prior legal precedents, however, it also stresses humanitarian needs of the community. The number of children, the lack of access to education, increased homelessness, inadequate drinking water, poor sanitation and health facilities are all points raised by the judge to justify the stay (HAQ versus Government of NCT, 2011). Further, the order makes demands that the DDA must follow, in order to end the protections of the stay, saying, “It is therefore incumbent on the DDA to find out if any of the persons whose jhuggies are demolished were entitled to rehabilitation in terms of the said policy” (ibid). Using authoritative discourse, the court demands action for other government agencies and wields power over them, thus offering protection to the marginalized and now dispossessed residents of Gayatri Colony.

The last piece of policy evidence comes from a recent memo sent to the local police station from the DDA. Shown to us by DDA representatives, the June 2018 document concerned development in Gulshan Chowk, a neighborhood abutting Gayatri Colony that was partially demolished in July 2017. Now holding a stay order issued by the High Court, Gulshan Chowk is protected from future demolition until steps of surveying, notification, and rehabilitation are done. However, that has not stopped the DDA from lodging powerless complaints for the local police to act, to stop what an Executive Engineer describes as ‘unauthorized’ and ‘illegal construction’ (DDA, 2018). The engineer employs technical, bureaucratic language to insist that the police intervene. However, in the opening paragraph, the official acknowledges the DDA’s powerlessness, referring to the “status-quo granted by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) 7143/2017, this program was also postponed” (ibid). In speaking to the Station House Officer (SHO), the head of the local police department representing Gayatri Colony and Gulshan Chowk, I was told police can only document construction in question, but they lack authority to

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48 Dalits are an historically marginalized group, seen as outside the varna caste system in India, and colloquially known as untouchables. They are classified as scheduled castes in India’s current census.
demolish anything without prior approval from the courts and following DDA procedure (M Singh 2018, personal communication, 22 June). Basically, the court rendered the DDA’s desire to demolish completely impotent. Through documents and news, we see the importance of the judiciary for ensuring the right to stay, but it is also reflected in the testimony of activists and resident leaders, and even DDA officials themselves.

Reflections on the Delhi High Court System

The court system was well regarded by activists and residents involved in the current situation in Gayatri Colony. Abhishek Kumar (2018, personal communication, 8 June) of JJEM described Gayatri Colony as “an example for the rest of the city…because it is the only jhuggi that has changed the court judgement overnight”. It is true that this model of intervention—petitioning through the Court—was a novel idea back in 2011, as remarked on by activist Salim Abdul Imran, who was responsible for filling the 2011 petition for Gayatri Colony. Emphasizing the importance of the rehabilitation process as “our trick”, the petitioners argued for “due process which DDA policy has laid down” namely a proper survey, proper rehabilitation of all people, and a proper notice to residents of when demolition will happen (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 30 May/20 June). Imran was unequivocal in his explanation of why the stay order was so effective when issued: “…the only people that the DDA are afraid of is the courts. They are really scared shit of the court” (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June).

Because of the order, residents feel more secure living in Gayatri Colony and developing their property. According to Manoj (2018, personal communication, 7 June):

Now the DDA will not remove us from here, it seems difficult for them. Even if it does, it has to first resettle us. As that is the order from the court. DDA is also using false means to get the land; all of DDA’s works are like cheating or through false tricks.

Manoj is aware of the stay order’s power—that it will protect residents. Still, he is wary of the DDA trying to pry land away from residents or make life harder. In the lexicon of local DDA officials, Delhi’s jhuggi dwellers are encroachers who illegally occupy the land. The stay order, for them, is a justification, by ‘quack’ lawyers and NGOs, for people to build anything—temple, factory, or house—and for more illegal occupations by land mafias, comprised of NGOs, residents, and politicians (DDA 2018, personal communication, 19 June). Nobody I spoke with could confirm these claims. However, from speaking to DDA officials, their frustration with the court was clear, as they were prevented from clearing ‘encroached’ land, occupied by so-called ‘criminals’. Conversely, residents expressed a sense of security due to the order, which allowed them to rebuild and further lobby elected officials. On top of this, a noticeable reduction in police corruption has helped stabilized lives.49

49 In addition to the changing electoral politics, which may have contributed to the reduction in corruption by officials and police, residents refer to one particular story of violence that made police fearful of the area. Abhilasha and Manoj recounted a story about Manoj’s son, who was violently attacked by police after he refused to pay a bribe for the construction of a door. His son started clicking photos of the police and the bribe in question and was swiftly arrested, but when residents heard what happened, they rushed to the police station and fought with the police, eventually beating up a few officers. The incident was captured in the newspaper, eventually leading to the suspension of three police officers who were involved in the failed bribe attempt (Abhilasha 2018, personal communication, 4 June; Manoj 2018, personal communication, 7 June).
By first looking at the foundational text, the Regional Pact, we can see how, what I term, Techno-Legal and Urbanistic (TLU) policies, construct discourse around demolition and relocation. The very first guiding principle, mentioned before ‘participation’ and ‘consensus’, is ‘legality’. It states:

Respect of the law, the equality of all before it and the maintenance of citizen security should be the cornerstone of any measure. The compliance of legality is a *sine qua non* requirement for the construction of a cohesive society (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017: 14).\(^{50}\)

For Cañada, legality is supreme, without exceptions. This notion, while ostensibly serving as protection for the inhabitants of Cañada, restricts their possibilities by focusing on the urbanistic faults that are rampant in Sector 6 when compared to standard regulations in Spain. On the grounds of respecting legality and good urban design, suitable roads, public spaces, green zones, and good accessibility, the Pact calls for demolition and relocation (ibid: 29). This statement normalizes and renders wholly positive these elements of urban life, couching them as part and parcel to legality, despite certain obvious subjectivities when we consider good urban design and the types of public and green spaces that are necessary in an environment, such as Sector 6 versus other areas of Madrid.

Another TLU challenge that the Pact calls attention to, but fails to adequately address, is the 31 December 2011 cutoff date for registration as a relocation-entitled Cañada resident (ibid: 25). Currently, the Pact offers little more than a tentative promise to study temporary relocation for unregistered inhabitants or those registered after 2011, which one official estimated to be close to 20% of Sector 6 (P Navarrete 2018, personal communication, 21 Mar). This TLU barrier excludes inhabitants in Sector 6 who are already at the margins of society and could produce greater situations of vulnerability and isolation when the rest of Sector 6 is relocated. Further examples of techno-urbanistic discourse can be seen from media reports. A recently published Europa Press article, entitled “89% of the measures of the Regional Pact for the Cañada Real have been fulfilled or are underway”, takes the perspective of the Commission and its leader, Páramo, referring only to the achievements since the signing of the Pact, focusing on numbers and the timeline of the project, omitting any humanitarian discourse (Europa Press, 2018a).\(^{51}\) The article is very authoritative, from a government perspective, and affirms the success of urban governance, through its achievements and now the creation of a project webpage, which is supposed to improve transparency. Fusing technical language and data, the article demonstrates the material and social improvements in Cañada, particularly Sector 6, with the signed Relocation Agreement.

**TLU Perspectives from Leadership in Sector 6**

I turn now to how my interviewees expressed their perspective on techno-legal and urbanistic policy concerning Cañada. For key leaders—Páramo, Navarrete, and Martínez—the importance of following legal parameters was paramount. When asked how the Pact addressed precarity of housing, Páramo countered that, “more than precarity of housing is collecting who has the right to the housing in which they stay. Or the parcel more than the housing…because legally, it can be and urbanistically, it can be”

\(^{50}\) “El respeto a la Ley, la igualdad de todos ante ella y el mantenimiento de la seguridad ciudadana debe ser la piedra angular de cualquier medida. El cumplimiento de la legalidad es requisito *sine qua non* para la construcción de una sociedad cohesionada”

\(^{51}\) “El 89% de las medidas del Pacto Regional por la Cañada Real se han cumplido o están en marcha”
(J.A. Páramo 2018, personal communication, 2 Feb). His focus, to consider the Pact a success, is to assess whether, structurally and spatially, housing can remain or it needs to be demolished. While Páramo and Martínez concede that parts of Sector 6 could remain because the structures are sturdy, they were insistent that it is not possible as the laws stands because “urbanistically they cannot be there” due to the zoning for the existing regional park and the incineration plant at Valdemingómez, as well as the building style typical of Moroccan construction, which leaves support beams and rebar exposed for future levels, which “in Spain is not permitted” (ibid; B Martínez 2018, personal communication, 21 Mar).

Navarrete also demonstrated the importance of TLU justifications when discussing the issue of electricity. During an Assembly meeting, Navarrete read the details of an electrician’s report, using the term ‘danger of death’ (peligo de muerte) multiple times to insist on the dangers of the wiring, in which towers are placed at the center of a dwelling, the cables sitting right above the roof, carrying 25,000 volts of electricity (La Asamblea General, 2018). Abdel, the leader of Sector 6’s neighborhood association, replied this fear was exaggerated and that they had been living this way for over 15 years without incident, so why bother now (ibid). In a follow up interview with Navarrete, he reiterated the danger of the cables, by giving multiple examples of how a cable could fall and kill someone, insisting that “this is a situation of danger of death” (P. Navarrete 2018, personal communication, 21 Mar). Of course, this level of voltage and its placement poses dangers to residents. However, it is the attention given, and the type of dire discourse surrounding this danger, that I consider relevant when we understand how TLU justifications can ignore humanitarian needs or the types of alternatives that exist beyond or along the edges of law, all of which were not posed or given voice during the Assembly.

These concerns were raised by Abdel as well as the leader of the Parish, Teso. Abdel claimed that public officials are giving residents trouble over cables that have existed for more than a decade, way before the 2011 census, and that the public administration, through their insistence on TLU management,
deteriorated conditions in the neighborhood leading up to the Regional Pact (Abdel 2018, personal communication, 17 Apr). Mail delivery stopped since his arrival 17 years ago, potholes on the roads worsened, and trash pickup ceased in parts of Sector 6, while rigging of electricity and water from the city’s lines continues to this day (ibid). Since the Pact’s signing, there have been material improvements, such as more frequent trash pickup and paving of roadways, however, certain projects have caused more harm than good. The digging of a ditch for a canal along the backside of Sector 6 has led to mounds of dirt piled high, inadvertently creating channels for water that can inundate homes. Abdel expressed dismay with the administration’s handling of this situation as it did the exact opposite of its intentions, creating greater danger of flooding for homes closest to the poorly built ditch (ibid). Mockingly, he described the complaint he lodged with the municipal government as overruled because they were “throwing soil in a technical way” (ibid).

Teso, while admitting he feels Sector 6 urbanistically cannot exist, takes a more humanitarian tone in his rationale, something I will discuss in the following section (A.R. Teso 2018, personal communication, 5 Feb). In relation to TLU discourse, during the Assembly, he expressed his concern with overly technical solutions to the problem of Cañada, stating, “I would solicit that they widen a bit the space of representation for giving solutions. Because I believe here when there is a technical problem—we only think of the technical; the solutions are very technical” (La Asamblea General, 2018). Viewing the problems in Cañada, particularly Sector 6, as solely ‘technical’ risks rendering inhabitants as something to be solved rather than humans in need of a wider range of support and solutions, which could lead to unsavory results in the carrying out of the Pact. Concerning the relocation process, he expressed worry that if public administration is only oriented toward technical solutions rather than having a wider body of ideas, families may have the same issues when they are rehoused, which could lead to more relocations in the future (ibid). Compared to Delhi, where the legal system has acted as a new fold of power for basti dwellers, in Madrid, the legality of Sector 6 is perpetually being challenged and molded to fit into the parameters of Spanish urban society despite obvious challenges.

5.3: Seeing Human Agency—Humanitarian Gestures, Livelihood & Activism Discourse

In the final section, I evaluate each case from a more human perspective—how humanitarian gestures and livelihood become of focus in Madrid while in Delhi, human agency discourse circulates around activism.

Madrid: Examining a Dignified Life and Humanitarian Gestures

How does the Regional Pact address the value of a person and the social needs of Sector 6? Multiple times in the text, the notion of a ‘dignified life’ is raised. In Annex III of the Pact, a section is dedicated to the material and social improvements that will be implemented in the short term, prior to relocation, as a way to “dignify the conditions of life of inhabitants of Cañada Real” (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017: 23). These measures are intended to alleviate the struggle between the Pact’s signing and the relocation of “the population that finds itself in situations of extreme vulnerability and families in

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52 “dignifquen las condiciones de vida de los habitantes de la Cañada Real. (Anexo III)”
situations of severe exclusion” (ibid: 28). This is a humanitarian approach and gesture to the community in Sector 6, a demonstration by the public administration that they will provide for residents.

This current of humanitarianism discourse is also present in news. In a long-form article published by *BBC Mundo*, the Pact is framed as a TLU solution intended to repair socioeconomic damage in Cañada (Castedo, 2017). Intertextually, the piece consults a number of experts, entity leaders, residents, and census data to affirm the importance of this legalistic solution. It frames the solution as a fix for what Cañada lacks: normative elements of Spanish public life: squares, benches, shops, and pedestrian walkways, and provides a solution for rampant marginality in the zone (ibid). In addition, the tone of the article is unequivocal, beginning with a quotation by the head of Sector 4’s neighborhood association calling it “a stigma to live in Cañada” (ibid: 2). The Pact, as presented in this article, is intended to resolve marginality of inhabitants and improve their livelihoods.

The second article is by an important entity leader: an opinion piece in eldiaro.es by Parish leader, Teso. Employing emotional appeals, discourse of inclusion (frequent use of we, I, and addressing the reader directly), and a focus on notions of livelihood and human suffering, Teso makes a humanitarian appeal to reaffirm the value of the recently signed Relocation Agreement (Rodríguez, 2018). The process, which will rehouse the first 150 families in the camino sin asfaltar (unpaved road) zone of Sector 6, is the start of a long journey, as Teso describes it, with true challenges, but together, with administration, social entity technicians, and neighbors, they can make this a “journey towards dignity and freedom” (ibid). The Pact, the Relocation Agreement, and the approach towards Cañada is a humanitarian endeavor, in which the TLU solution is the beginning of eliminating isolation and improving livelihoods.

*Madrid: Humanitarian Perspectives from the Field*

Interview participants confirmed this notion of humanitarian discourse. From public administration, the conditions in Sector 6 were seen as inhumane and substandard, desperately in need of intervention. Páramo insisted relocation would give residents “a dignified living situation”, offering basic access to water, light, and sanitation, which is often lacking in Cañada (J.A. Páramo 2018, personal communication, 2 Feb). He felt once residents were given the keys to a new flat, one with a tap and flowing potable water, with heating and without rats, any fear of relocation would abate, and livelihoods could move one step closer to integration (ibid).

To NGOs and social entities, relocation is a sober fact to improve livelihoods, to address minimum dignified conditions of housing, access to resources, and connectedness to the city’s services, such as healthcare and education (N Cortes 2018, personal communication, 25 Apr). Likewise, the relocation process should be very robust, the “most dignified as possible” so that families do not fall back into ‘ghettos’ as has been a problem in past relocations (A Escobar 2018, personal communication, 18 Feb). Teso also framed relocation as needed when one considers the indecency that is Cañada, the present precarious living conditions, and the loss of generations in Sector 6, who are in situations of impossibility to achieve and grow (A.R Teso 2018, personal communication, 5 Feb). The present situation is one of ‘absolute isolation’ which must be corrected by a dignified relocation (ibid).

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53 “la población que se encuentre en situación de extrema vulnerabilidad y familias en situación de exclusion severa”

54 “un viaje hacia la dignidad y la libertad”
An important fold to this humanitarian focus is the notion of integration, or cultural integration. Many public officials brought up how critical it is that residents make changes in their way of life; culturally, they must make adjustments if they are to integrate (J.A. Páramo 2018, personal communication, 2 Feb; B Martínez 2018, personal communication, 21 Mar). Cultural integration was often intertwined with being an ethnic minority in Spain, as *gitano* or Moroccan. Asked about Sector 6, officials focused on the need for cultural integration of minority populations. Páramo expressed the strong cultural association *chabolismo* has with *gitanos*, saying “It is very rare in Spain to see a chabola settlement inhabited by non-*gitano* people” while Martínez felt that the *gitano* population was already coming from a context of severe rural marginalization prior to migration to Madrid, and thus the population was never integrated into Spanish society (J.A. Páramo 2018, personal communication, 2 Feb; B Martínez 2018, personal communication, 21 Mar). For the Moroccans, it was not only particular building practices that were seen as a cultural barrier, but the familial customs, which Martínez tied to Islam, that affected systems of care for immediate and extended family (B Martínez 2018, personal communication, 21 Mar). The officials also raised concerns that new neighbors of relocated families might pose a problem, due to distrust emerging from the heavy stigma Cañada carries throughout the city, especially of Sector 6, as a zone of delinquency and dangerous drug use (J.A. Páramo 2018, personal communication, 2 Feb).

Interestingly, the head of Sector 6’s neighborhood association, Abdel, did not mention integration. Instead, he spoke about his ability to build their property in Cañada 17 years ago with the support of nearby family, who work in construction (Abdel 2018, personal communication, Apr 17). His focus was more with spatial changes that relocation will bring, reshaping their way of living, from a “type of life of the countryside” with a hen and rabbits to one in a multi-block apartment, like a “rabbit in a cage”, away from other family members (ibid). Again, this is just one representative of about 3,000 residents, so it is hard to draw concrete conclusions, but it does raise further questions for how we consider fragmented humanitarian discourse that justifies intervention, and how residents may view the process differently.

**Delhi: Reporting Activism**

In contrast to Madrid, I saw a more active role for residents and housing activists, focused on direction interventions in Delhi. A report issued by NGOs after the 2011 demolitions of Gayatri Colony (Fergulio and Chaudhry, 2011), entitled “The Cruel Side of Delhi’s Beautification: Illegal Demolition in Baljeet Nagar” couches the demolition within discourse of rights, civil activism, legal precedents, and the emotional appeal of resident testimonies, in order to make the case that the DDA violated their own rules and residents have a right to stay and protect their livelihoods. The report, geared towards the perspective of other activists, donors, and court officials, also stresses the humanitarian suffering that residents underwent during and after demolition, giving them a platform in testimonies to share stories of horror and adversity (ibid). Concluding, the NGOs urge a call to action, for the courts and government officials to uphold “national and international legal obligations, and prevent further forced evictions of the urban poor” (ibid: xvi). The document demonstrates a more active role for civil society organizations, who are leading the charge for government accountability and reformation, especially in moments of crisis.

A more recent English-language news article from *Firstpost*, a mainstream branch of Reliance media group, details the recent demolition of the adjacent Gulshan Chowk neighborhood, which was mentioned in Chapter 5.2 (Acharyya, 2017). Using quotations from lawyers and activists, such as Aditya of IGSSS, the case for a stay order is raised, framed in humanitarian as well as legalistic terms,
such as the right to shelter (ibid). In the activism of civil leaders, who play a representative role for the neighborhood in this article, they expose the contradictions of the DDA and shame them simultaneously, doing it in a strategic way, unfolding the charges and silence of the DDA line-by-line. Through these two texts, we get a sense of the activity of civil leaders, but it is also true that residents themselves take a more active role.

Delhi: Multilevel Activism from the Field

As part of legal strategies, there is a wider body of activism that has tried to create more security for residents of Gayatri Colony and other informal settlements in Delhi, like nearby Gulshan Chowk.

The first fold activists and resident leaders tended to mention was documentation. With proper ID cards and proof, residents could further their claims and assert their right to stay. One activist, Salim Abdul Imran, pegged voting rights as critical when making a case, linking the right to vote with the right to co-produce the city. “The vote concept comes from the right to home. Right to the city. So, once you vote in the city—elected community—then you ultimately get all the rights to the city” (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June). A right to a home is participating in the co-production of the city, according to Imran. Others also denoted the ration card and Aadhar card, a biometric, identity number-based registration system, as critical for making stronger claims to land and proper rehabilitation (A Kumar 2018, personal communication, 8 June). While this knowledge overlaps with legal strategies employed in the Delhi High Court, what is notable is the level of education and awareness resident-activists have for this system.

Manoj, who works for the CBO, raises his voice on this subject, insisting everyone has a voter ID card and then rhetorically asking, “and this area falls in Hindustan?”, using the Persian name for India (Manoj 2018, personal communication, 7 June). “It’s not any different, right? And, we are also Indians” (ibid). He feels there is a double standard at work, where the poor are never given an opportunity to be allotted land legally, and even if, hypothetically, the government was selling the land, they wouldn’t take the money of residents. “Does our money smell bad and theirs [Reliance conglomerate] good? Take money from us…Even if we pay them double the price, they will not give us the land” (ibid). The DDA, in Manoj’s opinion, would quicker sell the land to private interests than to residents, so they must use their documentation and knowledge of the court to defend themselves. Taking assessment of all of this, Manoj interjects that if the DDA wants the land in order to develop it, they must file a petition again, hold a proper trial, and fight the case against the people, all things the government is unprepared to do after ignoring court-ordered directives to survey, notify, and rehabilitate up to this point (ibid). With these stable grounds to hold the land, building bigger is another strategy of activism, supported by resident-activists like Abhilasha, who argues homes are very well built now, which acts as a disincentive for demolition despite self-describing Gayatri colony as ‘illegal’ (Abhilasha 2018, personal communication, 4 June). Alongside documentation, which offers certain basic rights, the actual physical structure can exude security and create a sense of protection, which disincentivizes the possibility of future demolition. I return to this point in Chapter 6.

Undergirding activism, in addition to documentation, is humanitarian positioning. By painting the neighborhood as precarious and in need, activists and residents produce more stability and security for the community. The program, Samaveshi Sheher (Inclusive Cities), run by IGSSS, posits a discourse of marginalization, defined in three forms: occupational, residential, and social. Their focus, when writing up legal cases, is to make a humanitarian plea, focusing on poverty, the vulnerability of children, and the provision of basic services (Aditya 2018, personal communication, 4 June). For Salim Abdul
Imran, court petitions focus on the pain demolition causes for already vulnerable people—for women and children, and “how their livelihood is getting affected” (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June), including impact assessments that quantify material and social losses. Even one longtime resident-activist, Prabu Dayal, who is sympathetic to the DDA’s rationale for demolishing part of Gulshan Chowk, holds a firm line along humanitarian grounds, claiming “yet still, they are human beings and we can’t really move them out. So, for them we used to stand up” (P. Dayal 2018, personal communication, 30 May). These humanitarian appeals also seem to resonate in the discourse of elected politicians, who view the poor in the framework of political society, as a populous that needs relief which they—the politicians—can offer (Chatterjee, 2004; Chauhan 2018, personal communication, 4 June). As a result, there is still a lot of weight given to appeals and activism on humanitarian grounds, often for very valid reasons. Nonetheless, it is important to see how a discourse of humanitarianism is appropriated and employed for and by residents in order to improve land claims, and how one’s right to the city is developed through these ‘acts of citizenship’.

Chapter 6: Analysis II—Urban Citizenship Revisited

In the second phase of analysis, I evaluate previous sections with a more specific lens of urban citizenship. Shedding light on how, in Madrid and Delhi, the notion of urban citizenship is very present and constantly being reconstituted by the discourse of representative leaders, I demonstrate a wider and more inclusive understanding of urban citizenship.

6.1: Madrid: Urban Citizenship in Three Passes

Theorists draw attention to a changing landscape of urban citizenship in Southern Europe after the 2008 financial crisis, which brought a wave of austerity measures to countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Zavos et al., 2017). This turn led to a renewed attack on pillars of state welfare, namely social security, wages, and pensions. In addition, it reinvigorated processes of socio-spatial fragmentation and inequality in the city, particularly through housing (Fernández, 2015), contributing to a rearticulation of the meaning and claims of urban citizenship, and a closer alignment with social justice, solidarity, and inclusivity (Zavos et al., 2017: 381; Eizaguirre et al., 2017: 435).

In the Spanish context, the process has given way to new modes of citizen-participation and localized democracy (Eizaguirre et al, 2017: 435). In Madrid, scholars point to major social movements concerning housing, namely Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH), as an example of “ruptures of the hegemonic police order”, a true contestation in the post-political sense (Janoschka, 2015: 110, 104). Using Isin’s notion of ‘acts of citizenship’ (2008), Janoschka goes on to consider the protests of the PAH and other movements, such as 15M, FVRAM, and occupation of buildings and banks, as challenging existing power relations and reworking the dominant spatial order (ibid: 110). Scholars with a focus on Barcelona find similar trends of emergent citizenship, in which new forms of collective management have come into place as well as new local policy that encourages inclusion for immigrants who have been disadvantaged by restrictive citizenship practices in the past (Garcia, 2017; Gebhardt, 2016). However, since this governmental shift in the last half-decade and the refashioning of local electoral politics—Ahora Madrid now being in power in Madrid, for example—limitations on reconstituting urban citizenship must be noted, in part due to a “fragmented political landscape”, where not all residents are part of this complex, multi-scalar new order of governance (Gebhardt, 2016: 436).
Consensus?

Chapter 5.1 points to an embrace of post-political governance in Cañada, in which public administration and entities have constructed a discourse around participation, dialogue, and consensus as vital for a successful outcome to relocation and integration of Sector 6’s inhabitants. The participatory process, as I have shown, is foreclosed upon by organizational bodies that are structured to give significant power to administration while peripheralizing the input of residents. There are few pathways for dissent or confrontation, as Abdel indicates, thus leading to a tightly controlled and regulated notion of urban citizenship that is defined within the bounds of post-political consensus.

While the above scholars have pointed to a new mode of urban citizenship, which has reshaped the hegemonic order in post-crisis Spain, I argue the processes in Cañada fail to challenge this dominate order. Instead, in their legalistic framing, which enshrine consensus as paramount, true political contestation is nearly impossible for residents. In the past, Cañada and Sector 6 could be seen within the context of Holston’s insurgent citizenship (2009), carving out greater access and rights for poor urban residents by embracing so-called illegal practices of auto-construction, building homes in the absence of the state. That process should be seen as an ‘act of citizenship’, which challenged the paradigms of the state (Isin and Nielsen, 2008). As Abdel recounts, he bought his land in the accepted model of Cañada, not through paperwork of the state and banks, but by dealing with the purported owner of the land (Abdel 2018, personal communication, 17 Apr). Together, they forged an agreement and he built up his home, constructing “with absolute freedom”, out in the open (ibid). In the absence of state welfare or intervention, Abdel constructed his own livelihood and asserted his right to be in the city through Cañada’s form of property ownership. In this sense, Abdel and countless other residents reappropriated urban space for their needs, spatially contesting to dominant orders of land ownership and use dictated by the neoliberal state.

However, the Regional Pact and its circulating discourse of consensus reject this mode of land ownership, calling for similar policies of demolition and relocation much like in past decades, albeit with new clothing—a new façade that makes gestures towards participation, dialogue, and involvement of residents, yet leaves much to be desired when we dig deeper into policy and the words of leaders. Instead of space for open contestation, the process in Cañada forecloses on urban citizenship and makes paramount TLU narratives of the city.

**TLU Framing & Urban Citizenship**

Chapter 5.2 takes a deeper look into the Pact and comments by interviewees to demonstrate a dominant narrative of TLU frameworks and solutions. Embedded within consensus-based politics, these practices are put forth as paramount to other solutions or desires, despite obvious protests from residents, such as Abdel, who see the process as problematic and restrictive. Even the leader of the Parish, Teso, expresses the challenges of strictly heeding to overly technical fixes, which ignore obvious realities or the needs of residents.

Positioning Cañada-Sector 6 and foundational documents, such as the Pact and Relocation Agreement, as technical fixes further restrict and codify notions of urban citizenship, removing its potential to be a force of rights and social justice. Instead, Cañada is seen as a strict dichotomy: illegal and legal; urbanizable or non-urbanizable; ‘this can exist within current laws, that cannot’. Little has been done to scrutinize existing laws, which historically have ignored residents of Cañada, instead framing citizenship within 20th century notions posited by Marshall (1950), only with a more contemporary face.
It can be said that the same bodies, which at one time turned away from giving traditional citizenship rights to residents of Cañada, are now offering a similar deal to inhabitants of Sector 6, with the belief that the state will give them the same social and legal rights through relocation. I argue that without a clear framework of differentiated citizenship (see Young, 1990), which provides more legal inclusion for residents of Sector 6, the TLU framing of Cañada risks respatializing already existing forms of marginality and exclusion in Madrid, continuing a much longer process of displacement and dispossession in the city (Agüí, 2017: 235-236).

We must listen closer to how inhabitants define their claims to land, intertwining these perspectives into local governance. As Abdel (2018, personal communication, 17 Apr) says, “we are owners of our dwellings and we have spent our savings, everything in the house that we have”. He has poured not just financial resources, but sweat equity into his home, and believes himself to be entitled to this plot of land, as the rightful person to pass along the property to future kin. However, in the state’s current TLU framing, the right to ownership has been superseded by regulation and the requirements of relocation, thus burying the potential to act for residents under government policy and discourse, further constricting pathways to urban citizenship.

**Humanitarian Perspective**

Chapter 5.3 sheds light on humanitarian discourse that forms part of Cañada-Sector 6’s trajectory. The Pact, as a foundational policy document, commentary from newspapers, and the input of interviewees frames the planned demolition and relocation as a way to ensure dignity of residents, to remove them from a stigmatized, uninhabitable, resource-scare environment and provide them with new, socially-supportive apartments to rent with modern amenities. Beyond the TLU framing, the Pact aims to be seen as a humanitarian deed, a way to reduce human suffering.

While social entities and public officials all seem to coalesce on this topic, I find this perspective problematic, as it reduces the agency of inhabitants to determine or even having the right to determine their own futures in the city. Over time, as Abdel (2018, personal communication, 17 Apr) describes, Sector 6 has been reduced to a ‘politics of disdain’ rather than a ‘politics of value’. Stigmatization, government regulations, which have degraded neighborhood conditions, and the thriving drug market, have contributed to a political climate that views Sector 6 inhabitants as helpless, criminal, and in dire need of support. In this vein, the state feels the need to intervene, to take up the role of the provider for the people, a political society of sorts in a European context (Chatterjee, 2004). However, by imposing a particular certainty on the inhabitants of Sector 6, offering them little choice beside demolition and relocation, officials close off agency to inhabitants to decide their own future.

In addition, one must question why the 1 kilometer section, dominated by the drug trade, is nearly left unaddressed by the Pact and by public officials, if humanitarian concerns are sincere. Lacking any major plans aside from improving antidrug sanitation efforts, the drug sector will go further underground and shift to other areas of the city, as has already been noted by commentators (Comunidad de Madrid, 2017: 31; Gil, 2017). Those dependent on the drug market, as users and owners, are very vulnerable, involved in illegal and high-risk behavior. Pushing them further into the dark cracks of Madrid’s drug trade may worsen the problem. Following Abdel, who spoke in reference to the drug market: “what the state has to do is protect all human beings” (Abdel 2018, personal communication,

55 From a “política de valor” to “desprecio del mundo”
I agree with this sentiment. At this stage, the remaking of Sector 6 lacks this fold of humanitarianism, ignoring some of the most vulnerable of Cañada.

Instead, Abdel’s notion of humanitarianism is embedded in urban activism and asserting one’s right to the city. “You have to fight in order to earn your rights. If not, nobody is going to give them”, he states (ibid). While the rights of the rich are assumed, as Abdel notes, the poor must fight for more inclusion, demanding more social justice every step of the way (ibid). What Abdel seems to be expressing and aspiring for is a type of grassroots, rights-based citizenship, which scholars have observed in Barcelona (Isla and Irgil, 2018; Eizaguirre et al., 2016). Despite the already acknowledged challenges that come with a fragmented political landscape, this approach towards humanitarianism empowers urban inhabitants, granting them authorship in the “co-design and co-production of policies” (Isla and Irgil, 2018: 500). The public administration’s perspective, as seen through the Pact and interviews, sheds light on a humanitarianism that does not critically address what it means to be an urban citizen, thereby rendering Sector 6 residents agentless and in need of state intervention.

### 6.2: Delhi: Fractured Urban Citizenship

I now turn to the final section of analysis, examining the previous chapters on Delhi with a more intentional look into discourse concerning the constitution and transformation of urban citizenship. In Delhi, the term has a much more controversial and contested history than Madrid, and it is important to understand these local contours and how they can reflect back on Gayatri Colony. As was mentioned in Chapter 3.1, the 1990s and early 2000s, especially prior to the 2010 Commonwealth Games, saw a turn towards a dominant narrative of constructing the world-class city, and a motivation to destroy and evict thousands of jhuggi dwellers on the basis of urban beautification (Rao, 2010; Bhan, 2014). PILs were used to frame the demolitions within existing legal frameworks, enabling the middle class and elite to construct their rights as urban citizens by way of legal residence, through the courts, and in opposition to jhuggi dwellers (Bhan, 2014).

Urban citizenship became deeply tied to a ‘world-class aesthetic’, inseparable from a popular narrative of the future, in which the city is filled with only world-class citizens (Ghertner, 2011: 281). Ethnographically exploring these shifts in Shiv Camp in Delhi, Ghertner points out the contradictions and ambiguities for basti dwellers, recognizing that residents felt “acquiring a private home, even if through violent displacement, would bring with it the attributes of world-class citizenship: a sense of belonging and a visible place within the ongoing production of the urban” (ibid: 300). Private ownership, through whatever means, confers perceived legitimacy on basti dwellers and gives them space to co-produce the city. In this way, property was fetishized, becoming a “requirement for securing substantive citizenship rights” (Ghertner, 2015: 158). As such, basti dwellers imagined themselves as part of the future city, hanging posters of bungalows and detached homes intended for the urban bourgeoisie in their own homes, thereby reconstituting symbols of urban middle and upper class aesthetics into their own (Ghertner, 2011: 301). Ghertner imagines these types of appropriations as part of deeper political acts, in which basti dwellers seize upon world class aesthetics to demand the same type of world-class citizenship given to the urban middle and upper classes (ibid). However, other scholars warn that these aspirations for world-class citizenship may challenge notions of the ‘right to the city’, by providing inclusion upon narrow grounds, which reshuffles urban inequality rather than alleviating it (Anand and Rademacher, 2011). With these very specific frameworks of urban citizenship in mind along with wider academic interpretation in chapter 2.2, I now delve into Gayatri Colony, focusing on political resistance, the power of the judiciary, and forms of activism.
**Political Resistance**

The vote bank is still a dominate form of political gamesmanship in many of Delhi’s *jhuggies*. Nevertheless, my fieldwork in Gayatri Colony indicates a more nuanced picture, in which resident-activists are agents in a more dynamic paradigm between state, society, and politician, mobilizing a hybrid urban citizenship, between world-class aesthetics and inclusion, to demand certain rights to the city. As chapter 5.1 indicates, resident-activists of the CBO, Abhilasha and Manoj, were able to remake their relationship with the MLA, MCD councilor, and even water management agency, the Jal Board, in order to achieve their goals of civic improvement, to install a bore well, build sewer drains, and construct roads. In this process, the CBO has been able to manipulate particular vulnerabilities of politicians and strategically pit competing parties’ politicians against each other, knowing when and where to agitate or work together in a participatory fashion. In part, these actions by the CBO can be categorized as ‘boundary-spanning’, in which residents are able to move between state, society, and politics in a strategic manner, never quite remaining in one field, always moving along permeable seams (E Sachan 2018, personal communication, 15 June).

Over time, these actors, by treading ‘among and between’, have been able to make serious physical and social improvements to their neighborhoods. Through civic improvements led by strategic partnerships with politicians, they have created a sense of ‘de-facto security’ (Aditya 2018, personal communication, 4 June). The neighborhood looks more formal; aesthetically, its street facing facades give it a likeness to planned adjacent neighborhoods, feeding into a world class aesthetic of belonging (Ghertner, 2011: 280). As a result, the likelihood and fear of large-scale demolition has declined.

In addition, my experiences in Gayatri Colony call for a reworking of the traditional civil-political society dichotomy, echoing Menon (2010). This example of political resistance demonstrates the fluidity between political and civil society, in which, through everyday acts, residents of Gayatri Colony make political claims, construct stronger dwellings, write letters, hold meetings, burn effigies, and organize solidarity meals and protests, but also participate electorally, voting based on the fulfilled promises of politicians (ibid; Benjamin, 2008: 724). Rather than defer to agencies or NGOs, the CBO negotiates the complex and fluid bureaucracy of local politics. Using Ghertner (2017), the CBO demonstrates the ‘topological state’ and the ‘state outside itself’. Residents depend on influence and support of low-level officials, even electricity providers, for certain services (Das and Walton, 2015: S48). Yet, as the construction of the bore well demonstrates (see Chapter 5.1), the CBO was able to pressure the state from outside itself—via the Jal Board and CM’s office in this case—finding funding through proper channels (the MLA, Hazari Lal Chauhan), which justified further building up of “a vast informal infrastructure that provides reliable groundwater to hundreds of households” (Ghertner, 2017: 740). *Basti* dwellers mobilized urban citizenship to manipulate elected officials, pushing government agencies to comply from outside their own bounds. Ultimately, it improved civic services in line with an imagined world-class aesthetic, while redefining the very term to suit local needs, rendering the city more inclusive.

**Judiciary Power**

Gayatri Colony’s stay order was foundational. As discourse of activists, residents, and government officials indicated, the order was fundamental in providing added security and stability to the livelihoods of residents. In addition, it began a steady practice of filing writ petitions by housing advocates, which has secured the right to stay for many *jhuggies*, including adjacent Gulshan Chowk,
and provided protection from public and private redevelopment. However, as Bhan (2014) and Rao (2010) have demonstrated, these cases should be seen as exceptional when we take a wider perspective of the role of the judiciary.

Bhan (2014) argues that evictions and the vehicle of the PIL, mobilized by middle and upper class residents against the urban poor living in bastis, have reproduced inequality and contributed to greater invisibility of urban poverty. In turn, basti dwellers have been condemned as occupying illegal space, rendering their claims to urban citizenship invalid (Bhan, 2016: 151-152). Bhan’s wider claim about citizenship is that PILs exhibit a shift, in which citizens are being defined as ‘residents of the locality’ rather than of the nation-state where ‘residents’ is defined as inhabitants of formal, planned neighborhoods (ibid: 163). Accompanying this shift, the courts affirmed the categorization of ‘encroacher’ as an urban identity, validating the term’s repeated usage by local DDA officials (Bhan, 2016: 166; DDA 2018, personal communication, 19 June). Here, basti dwellers become illegal, while the force of the court has tipped in the favor of the city’s wealthy and well-connected. So, what makes Gayatri Colony different? How has it, to some extent, defied this legal enclosure?

Gayatri Colony is a relatively established colony with a well-documented history. Even at the time of the 2011 demolitions, many members of the community had lived there for over two decades. When demolition began, some of the oldest documents of longstanding residents were collected and brought to the court, including Manoj’s. Quickly, “the papers were taken and Salim ji petitioned the High Court” (Manoj 2018, personal communication, 7 June). In this way, the jhuggi dwellers were able to make claims for more secure land tenure, either in the form of rehabilitation or the right to stay (Das, 2015: S51). Aside from these claims and a little luck in calling Human Rights Law Network (HRLN), a motivated NGO, there is little to distinguish this case from the others that Bhan cites (2016). Lawyers from HRLN used a standard argument, along the lines of humanitarian injustice, saying the demolition violated particular fundamental rights of the Indian Constitution, while also making the case that the demolition ignored due process of rehabilitation (HRLN, 2011). Perhaps, the case’s exceptional nature comes from hard to pin down factors, like a more progressive judge or favorable coverage by the media, which might swing judges’ opinions, as Salim Abdul Imran indicated (2018, personal communication, 20 June).

How, then, is the successful stay order for neighboring Gulshan Chowk, in July 2017, explained? Gulshan Chowk was a much newer neighborhood lacking a long claim to the land like Gayatri Colony; admittedly, activists were unsure what the judgement might be (ibid). Moreover, there is proof that the current MCD councilor, Adesh Gupta, was involved or likely supportive of the demolition (Aditya 2018, personal communication, 4 June; Abhilasha 2018, personal communication, 4 June).

I argue proximity to Gayatri Colony, speed to mobilize legal defenses, and benefiting from legalistic confusion helped Gulshan Chowk’s case. Being close to well-informed and well-connected activists, such as Dayal and the CBO, who have ties to lawyers and journalists, engendered an efficient response. Within hours, a news article was published (see Chapter 5.3), writ petition filed, and humanitarian aid and financial resources allocated for protestors (Manoj 2018, personal communication, 7 June; S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 30 May). Filing of the case quickly was strategic. According to Salim:

“you want to file something—you file it immediately so that the DDA lawyers are not prepared for the case. So, they come unprepared and they don’t know the facts about

56 honorific term, used as a sign of respect
the basti so the judge gets convinced, he thinks something fishy is going on” (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June).

Almost like a script, DDA lawyers were unprepared and a judgement was made to postpone the trial, thereby granting basti dwellers a stay order. Since, petitioners have benefited from a particular ‘gray space’, in which the legal system has been unable to adequately demarcate or codify Gulshan Chowk (Yifatchel, 2015). The first judgement mistook Gulshan Chowk, stating, “DDA shall not carry out any further demolition at the JJ [jhuggi jhopri] Cluster in question (that is, JJ cluster near Nepali Mandir, Gulshan Chowk, Punjabi Basti, Baljeet Nagar) (Manju Devi versus DUSIB, 2017). Due to the judgement’s vague inclusiveness of territory, DDA lawyers were forced to seek clarification of the affected area, submitting proof of an area that petitioners replied was not part of the demolished zone of Gulshan Chowk (Manju Devi versus DUSIB, 2018). In the confusion, the judge upheld the argument, stating the “hutments would remain protected (ibid). I qualify this incident as a carryover effect of insurgent citizenship, which has given official proof (ironically via proof’s absence) to these settlements when the law arrives at their claims, initiating “a new participatory citizenship that demands full inclusion” (Holston, 2009: 228). While most jhuggies, as Bhan (2014, 2016) details, do not fare the same fate as Gayatri Colony and Gulshan Chowk, their successes still offer a narrow pathway for the urban poor to defend themselves and claim their right to the city.

**Activism and Humanitarian Positioning**

Part and parcel to strategies of political maneuvering and taking to the courts, is a wider body of activism that resident-activists and NGOs have supported in order to create a more active citizenry in Gayatri Colony. By using strategies of individual documentation and humanitarian positioning, residents have become better equipped at representing themselves, knowing their rights, and what are the most effective ways to claim those rights. This is an ongoing process that NGOs are focused on as a long-term vision.

NGO representative leaders I spoke with emphasized this point. JJEM leader, Abhishek Kumar (2018, personal communication, 8 June), expressed they try to make people aware of “what they deserve as rights from the government”. On top of the value of documentation, he adds the importance of coming into contact with the government in other ways: “their kids have been studying in government schools, they have done transactions with the government and hence they are equally eligible for land rights and to live here as citizens” (ibid). By initiating transactions with the government, whether by matriculating into school or paying taxes, for example, basti dwellers should be seen as part of urban society, entitled to the land on which they have settled. In his opinion, residents are becoming more aware of these rights, which “helps them fight against injustice” (ibid). For IGSSS, the vision of the CBO links directly to Lefebvre’s autogestion. As Aditya (2018, personal communication, 4 June) explained, their current focus is to build the CBOs as “self-sufficient, self-governed, possible independent agencies” to better manage challenges. Therefore, residents will be more equipped to fight injustice, whether political, social, or economic, contest through the court system, and negotiate the complex systems of structural violence that comprise India’s bureaucracy (Gupta, 2012). This is IGSSS’ long-term goal, demonstrated by their youth program, which aims to create “a socially active citizen…to train the talented youths to be the change leaders” (ASR 2018, personal communication, 4 June). In the future, they hope residents will be able to defend themselves and self-improve their living conditions, access to resources, and social capital. “We will only be citizens with this active citizenship notion that can kind of engage with the state”, finishes Aditya (2018, personal communication, 4 June).
Rupturing a developmentalist perspective of the city, Gayatri Colony indicates the importance of local political struggle, which can subvert vote bank paradigms (Benjamin, 2008: 724). Moreover, this activist approach embraces a sense of cumulative gain by growing a wider political consciousness across generations, focused on acts of citizenships and, more critically, the internalized belief that residents belong to the city. Consequently, I reject Weinstein’s findings (2017: 526), which contend that “historically embedded experiences of insecurity entrap informal urbanites” in a sort of confinement. While capitalism and the state do fight back (ibid: 525), Gayatri Colony demonstrates not just cumulative material gains (pucca construction, private toilets, 24-hour electricity, sewage, and cleaning workers), but also cumulative social effects—the learned practices of resistance and activism—that become part of local discourse and practice. Residents are now leaders and speakers in their own causes, refashioning controls on dominant modes of discourse concerning housing rights (Foucault, 1972). Gayatri Colony’s history of demolition, struggle, and political consciousness has deepened basti dwellers’ adeptness at mobilizing urban citizenship to achieve their goals, making them trusting of their own abilities.

6.3: Crossing the Tracks: Exploring Lessons for Delhi & Madrid

Up to this point, I have laid out thorough evidence of a type of urban citizenship that is fragmented, complex, and unstable, remaking itself as it is interpreted, mobilized, and employed. However, I have yet to explore how one case can directly inform the other.

What alternatives does Madrid pose for Delhi and vice-versa? To Gayatri Colony, I think Cañada-Sector 6 offers caution as institutionalization becomes a more standard practice. While housing activist Salim Abdul Imran believes “you can’t just continue fighting the central government for years and years and years” and there must be dialogue “around one table”, the case of the Regional Pact and the enclosure of dissent in Sector 6 offers a warning that residents must be involved throughout, part of the co-production of their futures, rather than passengers on a government project (S.A. Imran 2018, personal communication, 20 June). Unless certain power and rights are accumulated first, working from outside and strategically requiring the state meet demands outside of the state might continue to be more effective. In addition, Gayatri Colony and other jhuggies in Delhi must continue to foment visible and active presence in the city, to put added pressure on the legal system. As Madrid has shown, seeking recourse solely through legal mechanisms risks giving dominance to TLU frameworks, which have failed to incorporate a differentiated system of citizenship that addresses systemic inequalities. Lastly, Madrid demonstrates to Delhi the fine balance that activists must keep in employing humanitarian narratives as part of urban citizenship claims. Stress should be given to successful resilience strategies and activism, which give agency back to the poor rather than strip it away.

For Madrid, Delhi offers alternative strategies of negotiation in the political sphere—how residents and activists can take advantage of fluidity between political and civil society—to make claims to elected officials. In doing so, they can reframe the virtue of political will in Cañada from one that is self-serving, as a political to-do, to one that serves the needs of existing residents before a risky relocation. Likewise, residents of Sector 6 and other zones of Cañada can come together and mobilize the power of the courts, as was done in 2013 through the European High Court of Human Rights. Lawyers and housing activists must offer their knowledge and knowhow to make this more feasible in light of obvious cost and time constraints. Lastly, social entities (NGOs, civil society organizations, and religious groups) involved in Cañada must become more concerned with rights-based training—informing and empowering residents with knowledge and skills—that can give them the tools to defend their home and improve relocation
policy rather than the current paradigm of service provisioning. At the moment, social entities are putting aside political contestation for consensus, feeling pressure due to their implication in the framework of the Regional Pact. For example, instead of speaking out strongly after an unauthorized demolition in mid-February 2018 and putting pressure on the Spanish *Policía Nacional* (National Police), the anger of social entities was subsumed to sanctioned meetings and assemblies, leading to a weak apology from the Municipality of Madrid (Europa Press, 2018b). Lessons can be taken from Gayatri Colony, where service provisioning has taken a backseat to more visible, outspoken activism as residents have learned how to fulfill their own basic needs through political negotiation and manipulation.

**Chapter 7: What’s Left for Urban Citizenship?—Conclusion**

As scholarship on urban citizenship continues to proliferate, many have asked themselves whether the term needs to be retired, whether it can or should encapsulate a rights and justice-based framework, and if we should leave citizenship to strictly define the individual’s relationship to the nation-state. Joppke (2007: 38) calls for a return to what citizenship “essentially is: membership in a state, and to throw light from here on the rights and identities connected with it”. He rejects the turn that urban citizenship has taken, instead arguing for a legal definition which frames citizenship solely between the state and individual. However, this perspective fails to see how urban citizenship has become mobilized as a tool beyond the bounds of state membership, interacting in the urban in a fragmented, fluid way. From this vantage point, “citizenship is not membership” but a way of seeing “across social groups” rather than at the individual level (Isin, 2009: 371).

Other activists and scholars call for new or different terminology. The head of Delhi-based Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) told me as an organization they opt for the term *resident* due to its inclusiveness. Urban citizenship, in her view, closed the door to those who lack requisite documents, which confer political legitimacy and often access to basic services (Sahitya 2018, personal communication, 19 July). Yifatchel (2015) proposes the term *metrozenship* as an alternative to urban citizenship, which removes the territorial bounds that constrain urban citizenship’s claims-making potential. *Metrozenship*, for both individuals and groups, is “a goal for full material and political status for all metropolitan residents as the foundation for a just and resilient urban democracy (ibid: 736). Both *resident* and *metrozenship* have incredible utility when we build theories of the urban, however, they both have yet to show their utility for urban inhabitants themselves. From a constructivist point of view, urban citizenship has entered the discourse of activists, residents, and political leaders. It has been mobilized as a tool for claims-making against injustice of marginalized social groups. We cannot deny its political importance, even if we acknowledge its unstable, and, at times, contradictory nature. Following the term, as it permeates deeper into the urban consciousness, will become an important challenge in the future.

In this thesis, I have detailed the two-fold nature of urban citizenship—concept and tool—to demonstrate how urban citizenship is constituted and transformed by the discourse of representative leaders in urban informal settlements. This generative comparison between Delhi and Madrid points to the fragmented, unstable, and fluid nature of urban citizenship across transnational contexts. To review, Chapter 2 examined literature on informality, urban citizenship, and representative leadership to give more context to my argument. Chapter 3 outlined each case—Gayatri Colony in Delhi and Sector 6-Cañada in Madrid—as well as my experience as a researcher. Chapter 4 developed my methods and methodology for research and analysis. I took a constructivist approach, combining qualitative coding.
and critical discourse analysis, to find themes within discourse (explained in Chapter 5) related to urban citizenship.

These themes were: 1) consensus and political resistance, 2) techno-legal and urbanistic (TLU) frameworks and the power of the judiciary, and 3) human agency, humanitarian gestures and activism. Evaluating each theme through news, policy, and interviews, I found Cañada-Sector 6 constrained by post-political politics, which have framed humanitarianism, TLU frameworks, and consensus-based discourse as paramount for the relocation process at the expense of desires or needs of inhabitants. In turn, it has justified a narrative of intervention rather than resident agency. In Delhi, persistent political resistance, challenges through the courts, and appeals based on documentation and humanitarianism have produced a strong current of local activism, where residents are capable of representing themselves at many levels.

Chapter 6 brings the discussion back to urban citizenship. In Sector 6, I trace a longer history, from the initial insurgent citizenship-settlement process to a contemporary paradigm of foreclosure by the current post-political consensus. Few avenues exist for contestation and future plans omit any restorative notion of differentiated citizenship, instead fixated on equality by law, thereby risking the glossing over of Sector 6’s intense exclusion and historical marginalization through top-down relocation. In Gayatri Colony, urban citizenship has been mobilized to remake electoral politics, strategically employed in calculated claims-making. Meanwhile, claims-making by residents of Gayatri Colony and Gulshan Chowk through the judiciary, while exceptional, have proven to benefit residents from a carryover effect of insurgent citizenship—legal (un)certainty—which has provided more legitimacy and protection. Lastly, local activism, which explicitly stresses right-based citizenship and seeking justice, has developed a robust political consciousness for residents. Thus, I refute Weinstein’s (2017) notion of ‘confinement’ by gesturing to the cumulative physical and social progress made within and around Gayatri Colony. In the final section, I offered modes of action and caution for each case, borne out of this rigorous, yet fluid comparison.

7.1: Lines for Future Research

While this research provides deep insight into a transnational comparison that had yet to be realized, there is much work to be done. For one, both of these cases are very much influx. At the moment, Cañada-Sector 6 sits waiting for the first stage of relocation of the first 150 families (Rodríguez, 2018). The full demolition and relocation of Sector 6 is expected to take at least 10 years, so the outcome is far from certain. Furthermore, new political developments, like the recent reshuffling of Spain’s Prime Minister and the head of Madrid’s Regional Government (despite protections outlined in the Pact), can reshape political will and the trajectory of Cañada. Likewise, in Delhi, Gayatri Colony currently enjoys a peculiar stability due to a stalled bureaucracy unwilling to carry out proper rehabilitation. As the neighborhood continues to improve physically and socially, its legal future remains in the balance and it will be interesting to follow these developments within the context of urban citizenship.

Secondly, another comparative project on the politics of resettlement (and relocation) that link Europe and South Asia, such as between Madrid and Delhi, could prove to be enlightening. The actual process of resettlement, an exploration of physical and territorial spaces of relocation, and the interrogation of integration, as a term and aspirational politics, could add new folds to understanding resettlement on a global scale, offering another lens to view the transformation of urban informal settlements, processes of informality, and urban citizenship.
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